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Abstract 
This thesis examines three studies related to the effect of information asymmetry on capital 
structure and cash holdings of firms. Firstly, we examine the funding patterns of large and 
regular investments by large and small public UK firms. Our main finding is that both size of 
firm and investment are important in explaining differences in funding patterns of firms though 
size of the firm dominates. Funding deficit covered by external capital consists predominantly 
of equity funding for small firms and predominantly of debt funding for large firms. The main 
reason firm size matters is that smaller firms tend to grow faster than large firms and have 
fewer tangible assets on their balance sheets. Both factors make debt financing unattractive. 
Secondly, we examine financially constrained private UK firms facing large investments. We 
find that the leverage of constrained firms is generally nonresponsive to changes in traditional 
determinants of leverage. This contrasts with unconstrained firms who show the expected 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage. When faced with financing deficits, 
constrained firms are nonresponsive to new debt or new equity while unconstrained firms make 
changes to new debt. We attribute this to a relatively higher level of information asymmetry of 
constrained private firms limiting their ability to address financing deficits by changing their 
debt and equity holdings. 
The third paper examines excess cash holdings among European firms. The results indicate 
that determinants of excess cash depend on the level of turnover growth a firm falls in any 
given year. The middle group however dominates whenever there is a difference between 
groupings. When different combinations of high debt and high excess cash are considered, it 
appears that the unusual combination of a simultaneous high-level debt and excess cash results 
from greater investment in Research and Development and CAPEX unlike High Debt-Low-
Excess cash firms.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Firms exist to carry out investments on a continuous basis. The amount and type of investments 
they carry out often influences how such investments are funded and how much cash is held in 
reserve in anticipation of current and future investments. The choice is usually between internal 
funding sources, like retained earnings, external funding sources, like new debt or new equity, 
or a mix of all types of funding. Therefore, the type of instruments firms employ in financing 
their investments, as well as, the composition and mix of such instruments has been a 
longstanding subject of interest. Capital structure theories have thus evolved with the basic aim 
of rationalizing the financing decisions of firms alongside their corresponding investment and 
dividend decisions. Theories have attempted to explain why a firm will have a particular mix 
of equity and debt and/or in what order financing instruments will be employed. The 
implications of these theories can also be extended to the amount of cash and near cash 
instruments firms will hold at any given time (Frank and Goyal, 2007). 
Equity and debt instruments differ in terms of three major characteristics, seniority, amount 
and timing of repayments as well as ownership and control rights. Seniority of repayment 
implies that holders of debt instruments have priority in being paid over and above holders of 
other types of securities. Amount and timing of repayments implies that debt holders are paid 
predefined amounts at predefined intervals. These payments must be made irrespective of 
company performance. The residual of whatever is left after debt holders have been paid is 
reserved for equity holders. Ownership and control rights of debt holders is however limited to 
insolvency of the firm. That is, debt holders do not have rights as to how the company is run 
except in the event of the inability of the firm to make the predefined payments. This is when 
they can take over the assets of the firm in line with pre agreed covenants (Vernimmen et al., 
2014). 
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These peculiar characteristics of debt and equity have implications for profitability, liquidity 
and long-term survival of firms. Managers are therefore concerned with creating an optimal 
mix of debt and equity financing in line with their strategic goals. The mix of debt and equity 
held by managers also influences the amount of and/or need for cash or near cash instruments. 
Several theories have attempted an explanation of how and why managers make decisions with 
respect to what financing mix they should have in their capital structure. 
The Pecking order and Trade-off theories are two such theories which attempt to rationalize 
the capital structure choices of firms. The pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984) holds that firms will employ internal sources of capital before external sources 
and, when external sources are required, debt will be preferred to equity. Rationalizations for 
this behaviour have included transaction costs associated with issuing new securities 
(Donaldson, 1961) and, more recently, information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984). On 
the other hand, the Trade-off theory is based on the premise that debt has certain benefits and 
costs. The benefits of debt include their tax deductibility while costs include potential 
bankruptcy and agency costs. Firms must, therefore, balance the potential benefits of debt 
financing against related costs. According to this theory, the major challenge for firms is to 
design their capital structure in such a way that the costs and benefits of debt are optimized 
(Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2007). 
Empirical studies have attempted to test the validity of the trade-off and/or the pecking order 
theories with mixed results. They include those of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999); Chirinko 
and Singha (2000); Frank and Goyal (2003) and Mayer and Sussman (2003). The next section 
will examine in more detail the main arguments of the trade-off and pecking order theory within 
the context of this study. 
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Theoretical Background 
Modigliani and Miller Irrelevance Theory 
Modern corporate finance theories are largely founded on the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
irrelevance theory. The theory assumes a perfect capital market with free borrowing and 
lending, no market frictions and no information asymmetry among other simplifying 
assumptions. The implication of these assumptions is that private investors can easily undo any 
unwanted actions of firms and thus be able to create debt where desired but not available from 
firms, or offload debts where firms create unwanted debts. Consequently, according to this 
theory, the structure and mix of securities employed by firms is considered irrelevant to the 
value of the firm (Frank and Goyal, 2007).  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) made a few propositions. According to them, securities having a 
similar pattern of return will have a similar price. Thus, with the assumption of a perfect capital 
market, equilibrium will result in a situation where the financing choices of firms will have no 
effect on their market value. Indeed, according to them, if the contrary was the case, arbitrage 
opportunities will arise resulting in a reversal to equilibrium. Fama (1976) pointed out several 
necessary conditions before arbitrage can be possible. They include, a perfect capital market 
with zero taxes, transaction, bankruptcy and agency costs; uniform expectations and absence 
of information asymmetry; ability of individual investors to create similar securities to those 
created by firms; presence of debt covenants to protect risky debts amongst others.  
However, the theory becomes somewhat impractical if one or more of its simplifying 
assumptions are relaxed. The relaxation of one or more of the assumptions of this theory has 
resulted in other capital structure theories including the trade-off, pecking order theories of 
capital structure. 
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Trade-off Theory 
Under the trade-off theory of capital structure, firms attempt to optimise the costs and benefits 
of debt financing. Benefits of debt include its tax deductibility and reduction in the agency cost 
of equity. Costs of utilizing debt financing include increase in the possibility of financial 
distress or bankruptcy and increased agency costs related to debt issuance (Fama and French, 
2002).  
The tax deductibility benefit arises because interest due to debt holders is deductible from 
income before taxes are charged. Therefore, the higher the level of interest payable on debts, 
the lower the tax payable by firms thus increasing the total value attributable to all types of 
fund providers. Agency costs of equity are also reduced when debts are held. It is believed that 
debt financing ensures the greatest discipline from managers and forces them to produce a 
higher level of output relative to equity financing (Fama and French, 2002). 
However, as firms are subject to takeover by debt holders if interest payments are not made as 
and when due, the risks of bankruptcy and/or insolvency is increased with higher levels of debt. 
Agency costs of holding debts, including the ‘debt overhang’ and ‘risk shifting’ problem, are 
also increased. The debt overhang problem refers to a situation where firms must pass off 
profitable projects due to high levels of debt. The risk shifting problem emanates from the fact 
that debt holders receive pre-determined fixed payments and equity holders are entitled to the 
residual. This could encourage managers to take excessive risk as debt holders will bear a large 
share of the loss if the project is unsuccessful, but equity holders will receive huge benefits if 
the project does excessively well (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The Trade-off theory thus predicts that firms will continue to acquire debt, up to a point where 
the benefits obtainable from an additional unit of debt just offsets increased costs (Myers, 
2001).  The implication of this theory is that, there is an optimal capital structure and, other 
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things being equal, firms will continue to borrow if they still have the capacity to do so. Thus, 
irrespective of their current levels of investment, firms will be expected to continue borrowing 
as long as they still have incremental benefits to be derived from additional units of borrowing 
relative to potential costs. Based on this argument, we should expect that more profitable firms 
will utilize debt financing to a greater extent. This could also mean that firms may 
simultaneously hold high cash reserves and high debt if it is optimal to do so. This will serve 
as a means of optimizing tax benefits and ensuring that managers utilize resources and efforts 
optimally.  
However, empirical studies including that of Rajan and Zingales (1995) have found that 
leverage varies negatively with profitability. This result is seemingly at variance with the trade-
off theory. Increased profitability should mean that, other things being equal, firms have a 
greater capacity and need to borrow to enable them optimize tax advantages and ensure 
discipline among managers. The documented incidence of the zero-leverage puzzle (Bessler et 
al, 2013; Dang, 2013) also seems to be at variance with this theory. Firms with adequate 
capacity, given this theory, should be expected to have some level of debt in their capital 
structure. In addition, the benefits of tax may not be very important to a number of firms that 
have elaborate schemes to reduce their taxes to very low levels. The incidence of multinational 
firms using very elaborate schemes to significantly reduce the level of taxes they pay has been 
well documented. (See Darby and Lemaster, 2007; Sikka and Hampton, 2005; Sikka, 2010). 
Thus, a major benefit of having debt in their capital structure may not be very relevant to this 
category of firms. An alternative explanation to the nature of financing mix of firms is the 
pecking order theory of capital structure. 
Pecking Order Theory 
Donaldson (1961) premised his version of the pecking order theory on increasing transaction 
costs related to employing external sources of funding. Thus, according to him, firms will 
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prefer internal to external financing to avoid transaction costs. He also employed this argument 
in justifying firms’ preference of debt over equity as, according to him; costs of raising debts 
were less than that of raising equity.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) however based their own theory on the existence of information 
asymmetry. According to them, managers have more information about the true state of their 
firms than external investors. The concept of information asymmetry was popularized by 
Akerlof (1970) who employed the used car market to illustrate how potential investors demand 
a huge discount on the price of products for which they are uncertain about its quality. The 
pecking order theory thus posits that external investors will demand a discount on the value of 
securities offered by firms in accordance with the degree to which such securities are sensitive 
to information asymmetry. This will lead to the under-pricing of securities which are more 
sensitive to information asymmetry. This results in a ‘pecking order’ of retained earnings, then 
risk free debt, followed by more risky debt and finally, equity, which is employed only as a last 
resort (Harris and Raviv, 1991).  
Internal funds, being owned by the firm itself, will be the least sensitive to information 
asymmetry and thus would demand no discount to its value and thus will be first in line for 
employment when investment opportunities arise. Risk free debt will be the next in line due to 
its seniority, fixed amount and timing of repayment. It will be more sensitive to information 
asymmetry than internal funds as investors are not privy to the day to day running of the 
business but less sensitive than other forms of financing. Equity financing will be the most 
sensitive to information asymmetry and thus will be the last in line. According to the pecking 
other theory, it will only be used as a last resort by firms that have some form of financing 
constraint. This is because not only are new investors in equity external to the business, they 
are also lowest in priority for repayment and in fact have no fixed repayment. They thus are 
they most likely to lose out on some or all their investments if investments become 
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unprofitable. New equity holders will thus demand a higher discount on the pricing of the 
security to compensate for this possibility. Thus, firms issuing equity will receive the least 
value for securities issued relative to other forms of financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
In the light of the above, the pecking order theory implies that the major motivation for firms 
to employ external financing is financing deficits occasioned by high levels of investments that 
cannot be adequately covered by internal funds. Thus, firms who do not have any funding gaps, 
that is whose internal funds can adequately take care of current levels of investment will not 
be expected to have any borrowing. Furthermore, it should also be expected that additional 
units of debt financing will be as a result of one-unit deficiency in internal funds, given current 
levels of investment (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Fama and French, 2002). 
However, as pointed out by Frank and Goyal (2007) the strict interpretation of the theory will 
imply that firms use all internal funds before external sources of funding are explored. This 
may also imply that firms hold very little to no cash reserves if investment opportunities are 
available. This is considered somewhat inconsistent with reality as internal funds are often kept 
for transaction and other purposes even when external funds are raised. They further pointed 
out the lack of clarity as to when equity is to be introduced leading to the issue of ‘debt capacity. 
The introduction of tests for debt capacity, according to them, could lead to challenges with 
differentiating findings from those consistent with the trade-off theory. In the light of the above, 
the next section will focus on a discussion of the motivation, objectives and contributions of 
the study. 
Motivation, Objectives and Contributions 
This thesis examines three studies related to capital structure and cash holdings of firms when 
they experience unusual events. A common theme across all three papers is the influence of 
information asymmetry on capital structure and cash holding decisions of firms. Paper 1 
addresses the role played by size in corporate finance. The analysis involves an examination of 
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the financing mix of large and small firms when they are faced with large and small 
investments. We focus on publicly listed non-financial and non-utility UK firms in the period 
from 1996 to 2014. Large investments, in our paper, are classified as firms making more than 
twice their historical median investment. Our definition is based on Whited (2006). 
Furthermore, we define small and large firms as those within the first and last quartiles of our 
sample sorted by total assets respectively (Dang et al., 2018). 
Our primary motivation is to compare the effects on firms’ capital structure of investment size 
to that of firm size under different scenarios in order to see which of the effects dominate. This, 
we believe, will be a useful extension of existing studies especially those related to capital 
structure and small business financing. We find that both size of firm and size of investment 
are important in explaining differences in funding patterns of firms. However, size of the firm 
is a relatively more important factor. Large firms use proportionally more external capital when 
funding huge investments than when funding standard investments and large firms use 
proportionally more of both external debt and external equity when doing so. For large firms, 
external capital consists predominantly of debt capital. Small firms use roughly the same 
amount of external capital when funding huge investments as compared with regular 
investments. However, external capital consists almost exclusively of new equity capital for 
small firms. This is irrespective of whether they face huge or regular investments. 
Consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003), our findings contribute to the notion that the pecking 
order predictions are consistent with the evidence for large firms only. The small firm effect is 
therefore not driven by the difference in the funding patterns for different levels of investments, 
but rather by firm size.  
Our paper is related to Frank and Goyal (2003) and Mayer and Sussman (2004). Our main 
contribution is that we establish a link between the funding patterns and the size factor in two 
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dimensions:  investment size and firm size. Consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003) we find 
that equity financing is significantly and economically more related to a firm’s financing deficit 
than debt financing. Consistent with Mayer and Sussman, 2004, we find significant differences 
in the financing mix of large and small investments. However, these differences are relatively 
smaller when compared to the differences between the funding patterns of large and small 
firms. 
In paper two we examine private firms financing constraints and investment spikes. This is set 
against the background of some of the results obtained in paper one which, in consistency with 
Frank and Goyal (2003), show that equity has a more important role in financing funding 
deficits than that suggested by the pecking order theory. This is especially the case for small 
public firms. Given that private firms in general and constrained private firms in particular are 
likely to experience an even greater level of information asymmetry than their small public 
counterparts our primary motivation for this study is therefore to see how constrained private 
firms respond to financing deficits. In a comparative empirical analysis of funding patterns of 
public and private firms, Brav (2009) found that private firms are almost entirely debt financed. 
He attributed this to relatively more costly private equity resulting from a relatively higher 
level of information asymmetry and the reluctance of private firms to dilute their level of 
control.  We extend this study by distinguishing between constrained and unconstrained private 
firms.  
The paper examines the determinants of leverage ratios of private UK firms distinguishing 
between funding dynamics of constrained and unconstrained private UK firms. Furthermore, 
we examine the relationship between changes in financing deficit and/or its component and 
changes in new debt and equity financing for these groups of firms. We look at the differences 
between these relationships during periods of financial crisis versus non-crisis periods. We also 
examine these interactions during periods of investment spikes when financing deficit is likely 
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to be greatest. Our analysis is based on a sample of private UK firms in the FAME database 
from 2000 to 2017.  
We find differences in the extent of influence of the traditional determinants of leverage 
between constrained and unconstrained private firms. The widest differences relate to the 
influence of tangibility, growth and age on leverage ratio. This is consistent with a limited 
access of constrained private firms to borrowing due to their smaller size, less tangible assets 
and younger age when compared with their unconstrained counterparts.  
Given that capital structure decisions of firms very often influence the amount of cash and near 
cash instruments by firms, our third paper looks at the issue of firms holding excess cash, 
relative to what would normally be required for their day to day operations. This is motivated 
by recent studies which seems to suggest that firms have increased the level of their cash 
holdings over time. For example, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) in carrying out a cross country 
analysis of trends in cash holdings, found that there is a near systemic uptrend in cash holdings. 
J.P. Morgan Corporate Finance Advisory (2015) also suggested that high cash balances are due 
to large profitable firms, the slow economic growth, the recent financial crisis and tax 
considerations. They concluded that more efforts should be geared towards effective 
management of excess cash. This implies that excess cash holdings of firms could possibly be 
put to better use elsewhere. However, according to Azar, Kagy and Schmalz, (2016), cash 
holdings of firms in their sample were not necessarily larger than in previous years, if cost of 
holding cash is adjusted for. They thus attributed the level of cash holdings of firms to the cost 
of holding cash.   
In the light of the above conflicting results, we attempt an empirical analysis of the cash holding 
patterns of firms in major European economies in our third paper. We test, empirically, some 
aspects of the theoretical analysis by Harris and Raviv (2017) and further extend the analysis 
to examine scenarios where a combination of high levels of excess cash and high debt levels 
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occur simultaneously as per Huang, Instefjord and Shen (2016). We further examine different 
quartiles of excess cash holdings and compare the major determinants of excess cash across 
quartiles of excess cash and Turnover growth.  
Harris and Raviv (2017) suggested that huge cash holdings are more associated with firms in 
the middle brackets of growth opportunities as firms in the top and bottom brackets will 
normally not keep excess cash. We carry out an empirical analysis of their theoretical model 
by regressing excess cash holdings against relevant proxies for information asymmetry, 
growth, asset value, costs of holding cash, current levels of investment and other control 
variables. We carry out our regressions in several groups examining the major European 
economies as a whole and each individual country separately. We also consider all high 
technology firms in these countries separately as they are likely to hold more cash than firms 
in other industries. 
Our results are as follows: across all groupings, key determinants of excess cash holdings in 
EU firms in our sample, are Size and earnings (negative). Other determinants, which are 
economically less so, are Research and Development Expenses – our proxy for information 
asymmetry (positive), Market to Book Ratio – our proxy for growth opportunities and Cost of 
Carry (negative). Results for cost of carry and debt vary across groupings possibly suggesting 
the influence of the existing interest rate regimes in particular countries. 
However, when all EU firms are analysed in various quartiles of excess cash, we find that, 
across all quartiles, size and debt are a negative and significant determinant of excess cash as 
well as for all firms considered together. Cost of carry is uniformly negative and significant 
except for the first quartile which is not statistically significant. Market to book ratio is 
uniformly negative but only significant at the second and third quartile of excess cash holdings. 
Research and development expense is only positive and significant at the top quartile of excess 
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cash suggesting the influence of group of firms with the highest levels of excess cash when all 
firms are considered together. It thus appears that, apart from size, the key determinants of 
excess cash depend on the quartile of excess cash holdings a firm falls in any given year. 
When terciles of turnover growth are considered, it appears that, size and earnings (negative) 
and research and development (positive) are fairly consistent across terciles of turnover growth 
as key determinants of excess cash. However, the significance of other variables considered 
depends on the tercile of turnover growth a firm falls in any given year. We show that the 
middle tercile has the greatest number of significant variables and greatest explanatory power. 
This is consistent with Harris and Raviv (2017) who alluded to this when they showed that 
only firms in the middle range of opportunities will hold excess cash. 
Finally, when different combinations of relatively high debt and high excess cash are 
considered, it appears that High Debt-High Excess cash firms are quite different from High 
Debt-Low Excess cash firms. While Research and development expense is a positive 
determinant of excess cash for High debt, low excess cash firms it is negative and not a 
significant determinant for high debt low excess cash firms. CAPEX is a highly significant 
determinant of excess cash for high debt high excess cash firms, both statistically and 
economically. This is however not the case for High debt, low excess cash firms. This suggests 
that High Debt High excess cash firms invest heavily in research and development and CAPEX 
which accounts for the unusual combination of a simultaneous high level of debt and excess 
cash. 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows; Chapter two examines Investment Size and the extent 
to which it influences funding patterns of large and small UK firms Chapter three looks at 
financing Constraints and Investment Spikes of private UK Firms. Chapter four examines 
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excess cash holdings of corporate Firms in major European economies. The final chapter 
concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 Investment Size and Funding Patterns of Large 
and Small UK Firms 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
What role does size play in corporate finance? We address this question in this paper where we 
study the funding patterns of different sizes of investments by large and small firms, using 
publicly listed non-financial and non-utility UK firms in the period from 1996 to 2014. One 
would think size could be an essential factor for investments: if the firm is planning a significant 
investment, it will not easily find the financial resources available internally, so external 
funding is needed. Moreover, the investment decision will generally need the approval at the 
highest level in the corporation, with all aspects of the decision carefully planned. In contrast, 
the firm can make smaller maintenance investment within limits set for divisional budget 
spends. Therefore, we should expect that theory more readily explains the funding of a 
significant investment decision. The pecking order theory in the main explains the acquisition 
process of external capital. It is, in contrast, much harder to explain why firm size should matter 
for investment decisions. There is, nonetheless, considerable literature that demonstrates that 
firm size effects are common. For instance, Frank and Goyal (2003), show that the pecking 
order theory is consistent with data for large firms only, and Rajan and Zingales (1995), find 
that leverage and firm size are positively associated. Beck et al. (2008), find that small firms 
finance a smaller proportion of their investments externally, explained mainly by their 
reluctance to use bank debt. Also, firm size seems to matter for corporate governance. Cremers 
and Nair (2005), argue for instance that small firms rely less on internal and more on external 
governance mechanisms, and Vijh and Yang (2013), find that the probability of being targeted 
by a raider depends on firm size. There are, therefore, genuine questions to be asked about 
funding patterns and size effects. In our paper, we define large investments (referred to as 
investment spikes) as cumulative investments made during a year that is greater than twice the 
historical median investment for the firm. This definition is consistent with Whited (2006). 
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Previous studies such as Cooper et al. (1999), and Doms and Dunne (1998), show that firms 
commonly experience investment spikes. Large and small firms are defined in our example by 
the first and last quartiles of the sample sorted by total assets (see Dang et al., 2018). Dang et 
al. (2018), find that the choice of size proxy can be significant, in particular, for the sign and 
magnitude of coefficients on other variables in the data analysis. Two factors determine 
funding patterns: the mix of external and internal funds used to fund investments, and secondly, 
the mix of debt and equity in the external funding package. Capital structure theory provides 
answers to the second question (see surveys and recent contributions to this theory in, for 
instance, Harris and Raviv (1991); Rajan and Zingales (1995); Fama and French (2002); 
Stenbacka and Tombak (2002); Frank and Goyal (2003); Morrellec, Valta and Zhandov (2015). 
The pecking order theory (see Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 2001) holds that 
firms will minimise the cost of acquiring capital, and is, therefore, an essential cornerstone of 
this theory relevant to our study. 
We summarise the findings of our study as follows. Size is an important determinant of funding 
patterns of firms in two dimensions. However, the size factor is more important in explaining 
the difference in funding patterns between large and small firms than in explaining the 
difference in funding patterns between large and small investments. Large firms use 
proportionally more external capital when funding huge investments than when funding 
standard investments and large firms use proportionally more of both external debt and external 
equity when doing so. External capital consists predominantly of debt capital. Small firms use 
roughly the same amount of external capital when funding huge investments as compared with 
regular investments. However, external capital consists almost exclusively of new equity 
capital for small firms. This is irrespective of whether they face huge or regular investments. 
As documented by Frank and Goyal (2003), our findings add to the notion that the pecking 
order predictions are consistent with the evidence for large firms only. The small firm effect is 
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therefore not driven by the difference in the funding patterns for different levels of investments, 
but rather by firm size. There is a big difference between the drivers of changes in long-term 
debt. Long-term borrowing is surprisingly unresponsive to investments for small firms, even 
for spike periods. Changes in long-term borrowing are, in contrast, explained to a high degree 
by investments for large firms both in spike periods and off-spike periods. The latter point 
supports the notion that small firms are reluctant to utilise debt capital, consistent with existing 
findings, regardless of using debt capital as funding for large or standard investments. The size 
factor impacts on the relationship between the firm and debt-investors directly, therefore. 
According to Frank and Goyal (2003), an explanation for the notion that small firms are unique 
is that the information asymmetry between firm insiders and the firm’s investors is higher for 
small firms than for large firms. However, they also indicate how empirical evidence points to 
the pecking order theory as a better fit with the data for large firms than small firms (Frank and 
Goyal, 2003). This is somewhat problematic as information asymmetry is the key driver of the 
pecking order theory. However, smaller firms are also more likely to experience higher growth, 
which mitigates the adverse selection cost for the firm. 
A second point is the desire (or lack thereof) to retain control of the firm by remaining private 
(or seeking stock market listing). Brav (2009), in a study of private and public UK firms, finds 
that private UK firms tend to be heavy users of debt financing. The desire to retain control 
makes the firm reluctant to seek equity financing. Thus, the owners that are willing to go public 
and risk losing control of their firms may effectively self-select into being favourable towards 
equity financing. Thus, it may be possible that smaller firms in our sample consist of firms with 
shorter tenure as listed firms. Our data indicate that small firms are generally firms with shorter 
tenure as listed firms. However, the difference in tenure during spike periods is not statistically 
significant. It may also be possible that smaller firms in our sample are high growth firms for 
which the pecking order theory applies to a lesser extent (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Our data 
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also supports this notion as small firms are generally higher growth firms with the most 
significant difference in growth during spike periods. Our data also suggests that small firms 
have significantly fewer tangible assets. Therefore, large firms are more likely to offer 
collateral for borrowing than small firms. Even if this explanation is correct, however, it does 
not adequately explain why private firms and large public firms prefer debt financing while 
small public firms prefer equity. The firm size effect appears, therefore, a puzzle. Our paper is 
related to Frank and Goyal (2003), and Mayer and Sussman (2004). Our contribution is, 
essentially, to establish a link between the funding patterns and the size factor in two 
dimensions:  investment size and firm size. Consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003), we find 
that for pooled regressions, equity financing is significantly and economically more related to 
a firm’s financing deficit than debt financing. Consistent with Mayer and Sussman (2004), 
there are significant differences in the funding patterns of large and small investments. As 
discussed above, these differences are however small when compared to the differences 
between the funding patterns of large and small firms. 
The rest of paper is structured as follows. The next section examines the major theoretical 
underpinnings of selected capital structure theories and provides a review of related empirical 
studies. This is followed by a description of the data and methodological issues. Next is a 
discussion of the results. The final section concludes the paper. 
2.2  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that if the operational cash flow can be distributed without 
frictions to the firm’s investors, the value of the firm is irrelevant to its capital structure. 
However, the theory becomes impractical if one or more of its simplifying assumptions are 
relaxed. Such a relaxation has resulted in, among others, the trade-off theory and the pecking 
order theory of capital structure.   
18 
 
Pecking order theory is based on frictions in the acquisition process of capital. 
Donaldson (1961) premised his version of the pecking order theory on increasing transaction 
costs related to employing external sources of funding. Firms prefer internal to external 
financing to avoid transaction costs associated with external capital. Firms’ preference of 
external debt over external equity is similarly based on the assumption that the transaction costs 
of raising debts are less than those of rising equity.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) rationalize such transaction costs by the assumption of 
information asymmetry between the firm’s management and the firm’s investors. Managers 
have more information about the true state of their firms than external investors. This can lead 
to adverse selection in the market for risky claims (Akerlof, 1970). Internal funds, being owned 
by the firm itself will demand no discount to its value and thus will be first in line for 
employment when investment opportunities arise. Risk free debt will be the next in line due to 
its seniority, fixed amount and timing of repayment. It will be more sensitive to information 
asymmetry than internal funds as investors are not privy to the day to day running of the 
business but less sensitive than other forms of financing. Equity financing will be the most 
sensitive to information asymmetry and thus will be the last in line. According to the pecking 
other theory, it will only be used as a last resort by firms that have some form of financing 
constraint. Not only are new investors in equity external to the business, they are also lowest 
in priority for repayment and in fact have no fixed repayment. Thus, these investors are most 
likely to lose out on some or all their investments if investments become unprofitable. Equity 
holders will therefore demand the higher discount on the pricing of the security to compensate 
for this possibility. As a result, firms issuing equity will receive the least value for securities 
issued relative to other forms of financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
In the light of the above, the pecking order theory implies that the major motivation for 
firms to employ external financing is financing deficits occasioned by high levels of 
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investments that cannot be adequately covered by internal funds. Thus, firms who do not have 
any funding gaps (that is whose internal funds can adequately take care of current levels of 
investment) will not be expected to have any borrowing. Furthermore, it should also be 
expected that additional units of debt financing will be as a result of one-unit deficiency in 
internal funds, given current levels of investment (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Fama and French, 
2002). 
However, as pointed out by Frank and Goyal (2007), the strict interpretation of the 
theory will imply that firms use up all of their internal funds before external sources of funding 
are explored. This is considered inconsistent with reality as internal funds are often kept for 
transaction and other purposes alongside the use of external funds. They further point out the 
lack of clarity as to when equity is to be introduced leading to the issue of ‘debt capacity’. The 
introduction of tests for debt capacity, according to them, could lead to challenges with 
differentiating findings from those consistent with the trade-off theory. 
Under the trade-off theory of capital structure, the operational cash flow is subject to 
corporate taxation when the firm does not default on its debt liability and to bankruptcy costs 
when it does. Benefits of debt include its tax deductibility and reduction in the agency cost of 
equity. Costs of utilizing debt financing include increase in the possibility of financial distress 
or bankruptcy and increased agency costs related to debt issuance. Thus, firms have an 
“optimal” or “target” debt ratio to which they revert in the event of deviations which are 
considered temporary (Fama and French, 2002). Firms that experience investment spikes may 
therefore temporarily adopt a suboptimal mix of external capital, but over time revert to a long-
term target. Therefore, we do not expect the trade-off theory can adequately explain the mix of 
external funding for investment spikes. 
The following section carries out a brief overview of related empirical works. 
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2.2.1 RELATED EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
2.2.1.1 Pecking Order Theory 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) study a sample of 157 American firms included in the 
Compustat industrial database from 1971 to 1989. They employ a concise model which tests 
debt financing against internal financing gaps. Thus, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) test of 
the Pecking Order Theory (POT) is based on: 
∆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =     𝑎𝑎 +  𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (1) 
Where ∆D is the amount of debt issued or retired, i is a firm index, t is time index, and bpo is 
the pecking order coefficient. 
Under their model, the major determinant of debt financing is financing deficit (DEF in 
equation 1) as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  =     𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖      (2) 
DIV is dividends, X is capital expenditures, ∆W is the net increase in working capital, Rt is the 
current portion of long-term debt, and Ct is operating cash flow.  
Under this scenario, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) hold that a change in financing deficit 
should lead to a (near) unity change in debt financing. Furthermore, they hold that the pecking 
order theory was better at predicting financing behaviour of firms than the static trade off 
theory. They, however, had a number of restrictions including, importantly, a requirement that 
firms have no reporting gaps in their financial statements. This they admit could lead to a 
greater probability of selecting large firms. They claim this would have limited effect on tests 
of the pecking order theory. However Frank and Goyal (2003) show how these restrictions 
result in biased estimates. Furthermore, Chirinko and Singha (2000), analyse different 
scenarios were this model could lead to misleading conclusions. We partly address this by 
including relatively smaller firms in our sample.  
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Chirinko and Singha (2000) show that the conclusions of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
when set in more realistic contexts, could result in inaccurate inferences. According to them, 
tests of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) could neither explain the pecking order nor the static 
trade-off theory. They arrive at this conclusion by considering three situations and showing 
that under these scenarios, it would be inappropriate to conclude that the pecking order theory 
dominates the trade-off theory. The three scenarios they analyse are, when the share of equity 
financing is substantially increased; when equity is not employed in the exact order predicted 
by the POT and when debt and equity are consistently issued in fixed amounts. They thus 
recommend alternative tests which can adequately differentiate alternative theories.  
Frank and Goyal (2003), used a similar model as that of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). 
They however exclude the current portion of long term debt in the calculation of the financing 
deficit, as according to them, the inclusion of this variable was not necessary in this context. 
Furthermore, in addition, they also carry out a regression of debt financing against its 
components as follows; 
∆𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =     𝑎𝑎 +  𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝑏𝑏𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤∆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 −  𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (3) 
Where I is investments. 
They hold that under this scenario, the pecking order theory should result in bDIV = bI = bw = bC 
= 1. They show that, results obtained by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) were heavily 
influenced by the requirement of no reporting gaps and the time period used in their analysis. 
They also show that allowing for the inclusion of firms with reporting gaps, which they argue, 
is allowable under the pecking order theory, results in a major difference in results obtained. 
They thus conclude that the pecking order theory could not adequately rationalize the financing 
behaviour of most firms. We take their analysis further by isolating periods of huge investments 
for closer examination. This is on the premise that this should be the scenario where the pecking 
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order theory can be expected to perform best as this is likely to be the period that coincides 
with the highest levels of financing deficits relative to other periods. We use a similar 
regression model in our analysis.  
2.2.1.2 Large Investments 
Mayer and Sussman (2004) introduce the idea of investment spikes by using a filter that 
identifies investments that are significantly above the average for a moving five-year period 
(with the spike in the middle year). Although they find that debt is predominantly used to fund 
investment spikes, there is little evidence in support of the pecking order theory’s assertion that 
the firm prefers internal to external financing. Furthermore, they find evidence in support of 
firms’ mean reversion behaviour as it relates to debt. They conclude that neither theory fully 
explains the capital structure behaviour of firms. Im, Mayer, and Sussman (2017) extend their 
analysis, and they conclude that spikes are largely debt financed. However, they also find that 
small firms with relatively higher growth potentials, less tangible assets and more research and 
development spending are mainly equity financed. 
Mayer and Sussman (2004) and Im, Mayer, and Sussman (2017), employ the same 
methodology for the identification of investment spikes. In contrast, our paper employs the 
methodology used in Whited (2006). Mayer and Sussman (2004) and Im, Mayer, and Sussman 
(2017) make use of five years of data around the occurrence of the investment spike. The 
methodology in Whited (2006) uses all available data for each firm. Furthermore, similar to 
Brav (2009), we use a probit model for determining preferences between debt and equity 
financing during spikes. 
Dudley (2012) carries out an empirical analysis of U.S. based industrial firms and finds that 
large investments are used as a vehicle to adjust leverage towards the target at relatively lower 
costs. Equity is employed before debt to achieve this end. He concludes that his results are in 
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line with the trade-off theory. Dudley (2012) defines large investments relative to the industry 
median.  
Other related studies include Morrellec, Valta and Zhandov (2015) and Stenbacka and Tombak 
(2002). The identification methodology used in Whited (2006) for investment spikes is also 
adopted by Morrellec, Valta, and Zhandov (2015). Stenbacka and Tombak (2002) examine 
interactions between different financing instruments and how they influence investment policy, 
which is not so closely related to our study. 
2.2.1.3 Small Firm Effects 
There is considerable evidence of a small firm effect in corporate finance. Beck et al. (2008) 
find that small firms use less external finance. Their analysis span data for 48 countries and 
they find that the funding patterns of small firms are like those of firms in countries with weak 
financial infrastructure. The small firm effect is explained, therefore, by the notion that they 
are more likely to be financially constrained than large firms. In turn, asymmetric information 
and adverse selection costs explain why they are financially constrained. A higher number of 
bank relationships causes the cost of borrowing to go down (see Bonfim et al. 2017) which 
supports the asymmetric information effect. 
2.2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We examine two implications of the pecking order theory during investment spikes. The first 
implication is that the firm prefers internal to external funds (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; 
Frank and Goyal 2003): 
Implication 1: During investment spikes internal funds are preferred to external funds 
A change in the financing deficit is expected to result in a similar pound for a pound change in 
debt financing.  This should be more the case during investment spikes with a higher possibility 
of substantially higher levels of financing deficit.  In a regression of debt financing against 
individual components of the financing deficit, we expect a (near) perfect positive relationship 
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between debt financing and investment, change in working capital and dividends. We expect a 
near (perfect) negative relationship between debt financing and internal funds. The pecking 
order theory predicts that equity, another source of external funding, is only used as a last resort 
(Frank and Goyal 2003). We, therefore, expect little or no relationship between financing 
deficit and equity financing, if the pecking order theory holds.  
The second implication of the pecking order theory is that the firm prefers debt to equity: 
Implication 2: During investment spikes, debt is preferred to equity when firms seek external 
funds. 
Under the pecking order theory, securities that are more sensitive to information 
asymmetry will be under-priced. Thus, firms tend to prefer debt to equity financing as debt is 
considered less sensitive to information asymmetry than equity financing. (Harris and Raviv, 
1991; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Periods of investment spikes will be expected to be the time 
when firms need external financing the most. We should, therefore, expect that, given the 
pecking order theory’s suggestions, debt is considered to be the primary method of financing 
investment spikes.  Accordingly, we expect that the debt regression will indicate a preference 
for debt over equity during investment spikes.  
2.3 DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
We collect a sample of all publicly listed UK firms in the Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
database from 1996-2014. This period was chosen to enable us observe funding dynamics 
across different crises and non-crises periods.  We exclude firms from the financial and utility 
sectors (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999) based on the peculiar nature of their financing 
mix (Whited 2006). We also exclude firms whose value of total assets is either zero or missing. 
This process results in a final sample of 1,888 firms and 20,115 firm-years comprised of 3,888 
firm-years of investment spikes and 16,427 firm-years with no investment spikes. We employ 
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clustered fixed-effect panel-data regression analyses on three separate groupings, spike years, 
off-spike years, and all years.  
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to take care of outliers. A number of 
diagnostic tests were carried out. Detailed results are in Appendix 2A. Hausman test results 
indicate that fixed effects panel regression was more appropriate than random effects for the 
regression analyses. Furthermore, this study carries out Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in 
panel data and Modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity. Results indicate the 
presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. We, therefore, use robust standard errors, 
clustered by firm. 
2.3.1 ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
We employ the following models to carry out the analysis. Following Whited (2006), we define 
an investment spike as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =   𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  > 2        (4)1 
Where IS = investment spike, I = investment, t is time index, and i is firm index. Table 2.10.A1 
provides a more detailed description of variables. An investment spike occurs when the ratio 
of investment to total assets in any given year is greater than twice the median ratio of 
investment to total assets for each firm. The classification of investment spike enables us to 
divide the sample into three separate groups of firm-years, spike, off-spike, and all years. The 
analysis follows Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003), and Mayer and 
Sussman (2004) to conduct separate regression estimates for debt financing and equity 
financing: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =     𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (5) 
                                                          
1 The analysis was also carried out using higher thresholds of 2.5 and 3. Results are qualitatively similar. 
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𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =       𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (6) 
Where LTD = Change-in-Long-Term-Debt. EQ = Net-Equity-Finance. FD= Financing Deficit. 
α, = Constant term. e = Error term. Next, we follow Frank and Goyal (2003) by decomposing 
financing deficits into its respective components to examine their behaviour in a regression 
against debt and equity financing during spikes.  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =     𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (7) 
Furthermore, following Mayer and Sussman (2004), we include a regression equation for 
equity as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =      𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (8) 
Where WC = Change-in-Working-Capital. DV = Dividends. CF = Internal-Cash-Flow.  
We repeat the above analysis for small and large firms respectively. Firms are sorted by their 
total assets. We classify the first quartile as small firms and the last quartile as large firms. 
Total assets are deflated to 2014 Pound Sterling using the CPI.  
It must be noted that a limitation of this approach is the possible existence of endogeneity as 
the debt financing is likely to be influenced by level of equity financing and vice versa. 
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
2.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2.1a presents descriptive statistics of the whole sample while Table 2.1b presents 
descriptive statistics for small and large firms separately. Investment spikes occur in 18% of 
firm-years while the remaining 82% of firm-years are off spike periods. As expected, firms 
experience the greatest degree of funding gaps during spike periods. The average investment 
ratios (to total assets) are 12% during the spike period and 4% during the off-spike period (5% 
for all years). These disparities coincide with differences in financing deficit for the different 
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periods pointing to a higher need for external financing during spike periods. Financing Deficit 
is only 3% off spike but increases to 10% during spike periods (5% for all years). Furthermore, 
Change-in-Long-Term-Debt finance is on the average 0% for all periods. On the other hand, 
Net-Equity-Finance during spike is on the average substantially higher at 14% of total assets 
relative to 8% off spike (9% for all years). As seen in Appendix Table 2.10.A2, the relatively 
higher correlation between Financing Deficit and Net-Equity-Financing (0.52) compared with 
between Financing Deficit and Change-in-Long-Term-Debt (0.10) is noteworthy. Change-in-
Working-Capital is on the average -0.01% during spikes compared with 0.02% off spike 
(0.01% for all years). Average Internal-Cash-Flow during spikes is 1% of total assets. Off-
spike it is much higher at 3% (3% for all years). However, Dividends are on the average 
relatively unchanged at 0.01% of the total asset for all periods implying a stable dividend policy 
and should normally imply a greater need for financing during spikes given the higher 
investments. These figures underscore the uniqueness of periods of spikes and further justify a 
closer examination. 
2.4.2 ANALYSIS OF REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
2.4.2.1 Internal versus External Financing 
Following Frank and Goyal (2003), we carry out a regression of debt financing against the 
Financing Deficit and subsequently on individual components of the financing deficit. 
Furthermore, we follow Mayer and Sussman (2004) to conduct a separate regression for equity 
financing. We present the regression results below. Tables 2.2 shows general relations of the 
Financing Deficit with debt and equity financing and Table 2.3, in a more granular way, reveals 
the extent to which firms prefer internal to external funds. 
In Table 2.2, the Financing Deficit coefficient on the debt regression is a mere 0.04, very far 
from the predicted 1 if the pecking order theory were a perfect predictor of firm behaviour 
under this circumstance. We notice though that this coefficient is higher than that of other 
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periods, i.e. 0.026 for the off-spike periods and 0.035 for all periods.  More interesting is the 
coefficient of Financing Deficit under the equity financing regression. Under the pecking order 
theory, the financing deficit should generally have no significant impact on equity financing. 
This appears not to be the case. We find that equity financing is significantly and economically 
more related to a firm’s financing deficit than debt financing. Our results do not conform to the 
implication of the pecking order theory that equity plays no significant role in firms’ financing, 
especially during investment spikes. Further, we carry out our analysis with the decomposition 
method of financing deficit proposed by Frank and Goyal (2003). This is to examine the impact 
of changes in each of the components of the financing deficit on debt and equity financing, 
especially during investment spikes. Results ate presented in Table 2.3. 
Like the cumulative Financing Deficit, the individual components of financing deficit should 
have a coefficient of 1 (see equation (3)). However, the coefficients are not close to 1 during 
spike-years. A one unit change in investment leads to a 0.19 unit increase in debt financing. 
The coefficient of Investment in the debt financing regression is also slightly higher than that 
of other periods (0.12 and 0.18 for off spike and all years respectively). The result on Change-
in-Working-Capital is in line with the predicted sign and is significantly lower than a unit at 
0.03. The coefficients of Change-in-Working-Capital are largely the same as those of other 
periods. Results for Dividends and Internal-Cash-Flow are not significant during investment 
spikes. Dividends appear to have the opposite sign to that implied by the pecking order theory 
during spike-years while we observe the predicted positive and significant relationship for 
other periods.  The pecking order theory implies that changes in components of the financing 
deficit should be expected to have little or no effect on equity financing. This, however, appears 
not to be the case, especially during spike-years.  For each of the variables and all periods, we 
observe that the individual components of the financing deficit have significant relationships 
with equity financing. These relationships are relatively stronger than that of debt financing 
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and relatively closer to unity. It will, therefore, appear that, as suggested by Frank and Goyal 
(2003), equity financing follows the financing deficit closer than debt financing.  
2.4.2.2 Debt versus Equity Financing 
Pecking order theory holds that equity is rarely used and is only employed as a last resort, thus 
in general, firms prefer debt financing to equity financing.  The earlier regression estimates 
indicate at least some levels of relationship between financing deficit and equity. We notice 
that the coefficient of Financing Deficit under the equity finance regression is overall stronger 
than estimates of the debt finance regression, especially during spikes.  
Therefore, to determine the preference between debt and equity financing during spikes, 
we employ a probit model as per Brav (2009). The basic regression equations are as follows: 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =     𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (9) 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =      𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (10) 
Where D is the probability of employing debt financing, taking the value of 1 if Change-in–
Long-Term-Debt > 0 and 0 otherwise.  E is the probability of employing equity financing, 
taking the value of 1 if Net-Equity-Finance > 0 and 0 otherwise. We present the regression 
estimates in Table 2.4. 
The regression estimates suggest a preference of equity financing over debt financing during 
spikes and at all other periods. This implies that an increase in financing deficit leads to a 
greater increase in the probability of employing equity financing than debt financing. This is 
contrary to the implications of the pecking order theory and in line with results obtained by 
Frank and Goyal (2003) and Dudley (2012). In particular, Dudley (2012) suggests that firms 
prefer equity to debt during investment spikes to minimise potential bankruptcy costs that could 
arise if debt is issued before the investment begins to yield returns. According to him, debt is 
subsequently procured to take advantage of tax benefits when the projects begin to yield 
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returns. This is however contrary to results obtained by Mayer and Sussman (2004). Thus, our 
results suggest that equity financing plays a more important role than that implied by the 
pecking order theory, especially during spike periods. 
 
2.4.2.3 Small versus Large Firms 
2.4.2.3.1 Internal versus External Funds  
According to Frank and Goyal (2003), small firms generally do not follow the pecking order 
theory despite having, arguably, a relatively higher level of information asymmetry. We re-
examine the implications of the pecking order theory based on small firms and large firms 
respectively for spikes, off spikes and all periods. Small and large firms are the respective first 
and last quartiles of the sample sorted by total assets. Tables 2.5 shows general relations of the 
financing deficit with debt and equity financing and Tables 2.6 in a more granular way, reveals 
the extent to which firms prefer internal to external funds. 
In Table 2.5, our results indicate the opposite of what is inferred by the pecking order theory 
and are even more amplified than results of all firms as shown in Table 2.2. For small firms, 
Debt financing is less responsive to the financing deficit than results obtained for all sizes of 
firms. The coefficient of Financing Deficit in the debt financing regression is a mere 0.03. We 
also notice that it is not significant and zero off spikes, while it is a mere 0.01 for all firm-years. 
Frank and Goyal (2003) suggest that small and possibly high growth firms have greater 
information asymmetry and thus follow the pecking order theory. However, this appears not to 
be the case even during investment spikes when the financing deficit is the highest. Equity 
financing responds to the financing deficit contrary to what is suggested by the pecking order 
theory.  
Large firms are remarkably different in that the sensitivity of debt financing to Financing 
Deficit is much higher than that of other firms with a coefficient of 0.43 during spikes. More 
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importantly, the results show some difference in the magnitude of coefficients between the 
spike and off spike periods (0.23 and 0.28 for off spike and all years respectively). The degree 
is still very much lower than unity even during investment spikes. Equity financing is relatively 
less sensitive to the financing deficit than debt financing 0.22 during spikes (0.07 and 0.10 for 
off spike and all years respectively). It will, therefore, appear that, on a relative basis, the 
pecking order theory is more applicable to large firms experiencing investment spikes.  
    Table 2.6 examines the components of financing deficit on external financing. For small 
firms, the coefficients of the individual components of the financing deficit seem to be very far 
from unity implied by the pecking order theory. This is remarkable as small firms with 
relatively higher growth rates and information asymmetry should be expected to follow the 
pecking order theory the closest, especially during investment spikes. The results are however 
further from a unit in all cases than for all firms. Dividends, though not significant even has 
the opposite sign than that inferred by the pecking order theory. More than for all firms, the 
components of financing deficit should have had even less effect on equity financing where we 
have small firms experiencing investment spikes. This, however, appears not to be the case. 
We find that the components of financing deficit, for small firms, influence change in equity 
financing at a higher rate than that of all other sizes of firms contrary to what is implied by the 
pecking order theory. 
On a relative basis, large firms experiencing investment spikes follow the pecking order 
theory closer, relative to all other firms and other periods. Large firms’ financing deficit is 
highly related to debt financing than equity financing compared to small firms and all firms 
during spikes. Equity financing is also relatively less affected by changes in the financing 
deficit components as suggested by the pecking order theory. 
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2.4.2.3.2 Debt versus Equity Financing  
The earlier analysis has pointed to the preference of equity over debt during periods of 
investment spikes contrary to the implications of the pecking order theory. We repeat the 
analysis for small and large firms separately using the same probit model as in equation 9 
above. Table 2.7 presents relevant results. 
 For small firms, we see limited support for the implication of the pecking order theory 
that firms prefer debt to equity. The results indicate that increases in the financing deficit have 
a relatively higher probability of leading to increases in equity financing than debt financing. 
The coefficient of debt financing is not statistically significant during spikes. We notice as well 
that this applies to other periods as well when small firms are involved. This result supports 
the suggestions of Frank and Goyal (2003) that small firms prefer equity to debt financing. The 
results also suggest that this is the case during investment spikes when financing deficits are 
the highest. The higher risk of default for small firms can explain this. Banks would, therefore, 
have greater repayment concerns with small firms and are less inclined to extend facilities to 
them. Small firms focus, therefore, on equity financing as the primary source of their funding 
in spike-years.  
Next, we examine the behaviour of large firms. For large firms, we notice the opposite result 
than that obtained for small firms. During spikes, and for all other periods for that matter, 
results indicate a preference of debt financing over equity financing. We can explain this 
finding by the fact that large firms find it easier to borrow based on their more substantial assets 
and stronger credit histories.  
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2.4.2.4 Crisis versus Non-crisis Periods  
The coincidence of financial crisis and investment spikes indicates that relatively higher levels 
of financing deficit coincide with relatively higher levels of uncertainty.  We, therefore, 
examine financing preferences of small and large firms and compare crisis and non-crisis 
periods. Tables 2.8 shows general relations of the financing deficit with debt and equity 
financing when there is a coincidence of investment spikes and financial crisis. Like Abreu and 
Gulamhussen (2013), Sun et al., 2016, Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016), and Chen, Chou, 
and Lu (2018), we define crisis periods as years 2007 to 2009. We also include years 2001 to 
2002 to capture the financial crisis coinciding with that period. We define all other years within 
the sample period as non-crisis periods.  
    In Table 2.8, we find that for both crisis and non-crisis periods, equity is still more responsive 
to Financing Deficit than debt financing for small firms. However, the magnitude of the 
coefficient of equity financing is much smaller during the crisis than non-crisis periods (0.23 
and 0.40 respectively). Conversely, for debt financing, the magnitude of the coefficient is much 
larger during the crisis than non-crisis periods (0.06 and 0.03 respectively). On the other hand, 
for large firms, debt is generally more responsive to changes in the Financing Deficit. However, 
the responsiveness of equity financing to changes in the Financing Deficit is similar during 
crisis and non-crisis periods (0.24 and 0.26 respectively). There is, however, a considerable 
contrast between coefficients of debt financing during crisis and non-crisis periods (0.79 and 
0.28 respectively). This finding is in line with Doshi, Kumar and Yerramilli (2017) who, in a 
different context, show that uncertainty has a differing influence on firms’ financing and 
investment decisions, depending on their size. Thus, it would appear that the most significant 
support for the pecking order theory lies with large firms when there is a coincidence of 
investment spikes (signifying a relatively higher level of financing deficit) and financial crisis. 
As implied by the pecking order theory, with higher levels of information asymmetry and 
uncertainty during the financial crisis, only firms perceived as stronger, large firms, appear to 
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specialise in debt financing. Figure 2.1 reveals trends in debt and equity financing as well as 
financing deficit for small and large UK firms while Figure 2.2 shows trends in investment 
spikes with a difference in pattern for large and small firms thus underscoring the need for 
further analysis. 
2.4.2.5 Listing Duration and Growth  
To investigate whether small firms enter the stock market to open a new access route for equity 
funding we investigate the time since IPO (see Table 2.1b). We can think of a shorter time 
since the IPO as a proxy for the event that the firm is opening a new access route for equity 
funding. We find evidence of modest differences in listing duration and growth of small and 
large firms. The average time since IPO for small firms is around 4 years. In contrast, the 
average time since IPO for large firms is 5.8 years. If we measure the time since IPO for spike-
years, however (the years in which the new access route would be the most useful), we find 
that the average time since IPO for small years is 3.3 years and the average time since IPO for 
large firms is 3.5. Both small and large firms have, therefore, been listed for roughly the same 
amount of time when they seek funding for large investments. It is hard, therefore, to attribute 
the firm size effect to listing duration. 
Another possibility is that smaller firms have higher growth rates than the larger ones, which 
makes it more likely that the firms could seek equity funding for positive net present value 
investments. Even if there is an information asymmetry between the firm and the investors, 
therefore, the net present value effect will dominate the potential issuance costs. For the larger 
firms, an equity issue may be signal of overvaluation that leads to negative issuance costs, 
which may dominate the net present value effect (see Myers and Majluf, 1984). Measuring 
growth rates by the growth in turnover, we find that small firms have an average growth of 1.3 
times previous turnover whereas large firms have an average growth of 1.1 times, a difference 
that is statistically significant. Taking growth rates over spike-years only, we find a slightly 
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more significant difference, with small firms experiencing an average growth of 1.6 times and 
large firms 1.3 times. 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the funding patterns of publicly listed UK firms during investments spikes 
from 1996 to 2017. The study investigates the specific implications of the pecking order theory 
against the background of different sizes of investments and firms. The particular focus on 
investment spikes is due to the existence of relatively higher levels of financing deficit during 
these periods. The examination of crisis and non-crisis periods also leads to an investigation of 
the coincidence of higher financing deficits and general market uncertainty.  These scenarios 
present some ground for extending existing studies on the pecking order theory.  
Specifically, this study examines two implications of the pecking order theory. The first test is 
on the choice between internal funds and external funds during investment spikes. The second 
implication examined is that the firms prefer debt to equity during investment spikes. We find 
that, compared to debt financing, equity financing is relatively more sensitive to financing 
deficits based on our full sample. When it comes to the components of financing deficits, we 
find that investments are the predominant determinant for seeking external funds. In numbers, 
one-pound increase in investments requires 49 pence raised from equity issues, which is higher 
than the requirement of 18 pence from debt issues. On the implication that firms prefer debt to 
equity, our results, based on the probit model, suggest otherwise. This is particularly the case 
for the whole sample and small firms considered separately.  Large firms, however, exhibit a 
preference for debt over equity financing. 
We further examine whether the size effect matters on the funding patterns. Our main finding 
is that both size of firm and investment are important in explaining differences in funding 
patterns of firms though size of the firm dominates. Our empirical evidence shows that small 
firms prefer issuing equity to debt to address financing deficits even during times of large 
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investments. These findings are in contrast to the pecking order theory. Large firms, on their 
part, issue more debt than equity when there are financing deficits linked to huge investments.  
We can explain this result by the risk of default and repayment concerns by banks.  Large firms 
have more capital to address potential investment opportunities. It is, therefore, more likely 
that banks will lend money to large firms than small firms.  Furthermore, while small firms use 
about the same amount of external capital to fund large and regular investments, large firms 
use relatively more external capital to fund large investments than small investments. This state 
of affairs is due to small firms’ higher growth levels and less tangible assets making debt less 
attractive. 
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Table 2.1a Descriptive Statistics for publicly listed UK Firms 1996-2014 
Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. 
Sample period is 1996-2014. 1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt 
Financing for 1996. Size (£ Million) has been adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using the CPI. 
CPI figures were obtained from Datastream. Investment Spikes are defined as investments 
greater than 2 times the median investment rate for each firm. 
Variable Period N Mean P50 Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Debt 
Financing Spike 3688 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.06 9.14 
 Off Spike 16427 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.35 12.20 
 All Years 20115 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.22 11.42 
Equity 
Financing Spike 3688 0.14 0.00 0.30 2.91 12.19 
 Off Spike 16427 0.08 0.00 0.23 3.83 19.26 
 All Years 20115 0.09 0.00 0.25 3.61 17.47 
Financing 
Deficit Spike 3688 0.10 0.07 0.38 -0.22 14.78 
 Off Spike 16427 0.03 0.00 0.29 0.84 20.28 
 All Years 20115 0.05 0.02 0.31 0.60 18.74 
Investment Spike 3688 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.27 6.22 
 Off Spike 16427 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.08 16.80 
 All Years 20115 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.68 11.88 
Change in 
Working 
Capital Spike 3688 -0.01 0.01 0.27 -1.97 14.70 
 Off Spike 16427 0.02 0.02 0.21 -1.62 18.19 
 All Years 20115 0.01 0.02 0.22 -1.78 17.73 
Internal Cash 
Flow Spike 3688 0.01 0.05 0.34 -3.90 46.02 
 Off Spike 16427 0.03 0.05 0.26 -6.04 88.27 
 All Years 20115 0.03 0.05 0.28 -5.46 75.94 
Dividends Spike 3688 0.01 0.00 0.02 4.54 32.32 
 Off Spike 16427 0.01 0.00 0.02 4.20 26.21 
 All Years 20115 0.01 0.00 0.02 4.26 27.19 
Size (£ 
Millions) Spike 3688 323.98 31.92 1239.63 8.19 89.98 
 Off Spike 16427 677.79 62.63 2032.16 5.12 34.10 
  All Years 20115 612.92 55.13 1916.49 5.45 38.54 
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Table 2.2b Descriptive Statistics for Small and Large Publicly listed UK Firms 1996-2014 
Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long 
Term Debt Financing for 1996. Size (£ Million) has been adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using the CPI. CPI figures were obtained from Datastream. Investment Spikes are 
defined as investments greater than 2 times the median investment rate for each firm. 
  Small Firms Large Firms  
Variable Period N Mean P50 Std.Dev Skew. Kurt. N Mean P50 Std.Dev Skew. Kurt. Diff 
Debt Financing Spike 1153 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.06 10.69 638 0.05 0.02 0.12 -0.14 5.98 -0.04*** 
 
Off Spike 3670 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.17 13.50 4662 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.31 9.03 -0.01** 
 
All Years 4823 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.09 12.70 5300 0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.20 8.36 -0.01*** 
Equity Financing Spike 1153 0.29 0.04 0.43 1.69 5.11 638 0.04 0.00 0.10 4.81 36.53 0.25*** 
 
Off Spike 3670 0.22 0.00 0.38 1.98 6.25 4662 0.01 0.00 0.07 7.93 93.33 0.20*** 
 
All Years 4823 0.23 0.00 0.40 1.91 5.96 5300 0.02 0.00 0.07 7.23 78.18 0.22*** 
Financing Deficit Spike 1153 0.15 0.10 0.60 -0.29 7.33 638 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.13 8.68 0.07*** 
 
Off Spike 3670 0.11 0.03 0.51 0.34 8.01 4662 0.00 0.00 0.11 -1.72 27.33 0.11*** 
 
All Years 4662 0.12 0.04 0.53 0.14 7.87 5300 0.01 0.00 0.12 -1.03 21.61 0.11*** 
Investment Spike 1153 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.24 5.01 638 0.13 0.11 0.13 -0.08 7.26 -0.02** 
 
Off Spike 3670 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.10 12.66 4662 0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.38 18.74 -0.02*** 
 
All Years 4823 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.52 8.83 5300 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.48 14.48 -0.01*** 
Change in Working Capital Spike 1153 -0.05 0.00 0.41 -1.36 7.17 638 0.02 0.02 0.10 -1.84 30.58 -0.07*** 
 
Off Spike 3670 0.00 0.01 0.37 -1.17 7.30 4662 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.02 15.98 -0.02*** 
 
All Years 4823 -0.01 0.01 0.38 -1.23 7.34 5300 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.46 21.09 -0.03*** 
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Variable Period N Mean P50 Std.Dev Skew. Kurt. N Mean P50 Std.Dev Skew. Kurt. Diff 
Internal Cash Flow Spike 1153 -0.10 0.02 0.55 -2.25 17.98 638 0.09 0.08 0.08 3.87 46.08 -0.19*** 
 
Off Spike 3670 -0.09 0.02 0.50 -3.43 27.59 4662 0.08 0.06 0.08 4.39 68.14 -0.18*** 
 
All Years 4823 -0.10 0.02 0.51 -3.09 24.69 5300 0.08 0.07 0.08 4.33 65.98 -0.18*** 
Dividends Spike 1153 0.00 0.00 0.01 9.81 130.84 638 0.02 0.01 0.02 3.04 15.97 -0.01*** 
 
Off Spike 3670 0.00 0.00 0.02 6.75 59.18 4662 0.01 0.00 0.02 3.12 16.50 -0.01*** 
 
All Years 4823 0.00 0.00 0.01 7.27 69.40 5300 0.01 0.00 0.02 3.11 16.41 -0.01*** 
Size (£ Millions) Spike 1153 5.16 4.58 3.45 0.45 2.06 638 1669.22 713.20 2586.62 3.52 18.48 -1664.05*** 
 
Off Spike 3670 5.53 5.09 3.51 0.29 1.94 4662 2258.36 830.76 3325.30 2.60 10.41 -2252.83*** 
  All Years 4823 5.44 4.96 3.50 0.33 1.96 5300 2187.44 813.00 3250.74 2.69 11.01 -2182.00*** 
Tangibility Spike 1153 0.17 0.09 0.20 1.75 5.67 638 0.25 0.15 0.25 1.25 3.58 -0.08*** 
 Off Spike 3670 0.13 0.06 0.18 2.17 7.69 4662 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.82 2.71 -0.19*** 
 All Years 4823 0.14 0.06 0.19 2.05 7.07 5300 0.31 0.25 0.26 0.87 2.77 -0.17*** 
Growth Spike 822 1.56 1.13 1.64 4.09 26.43 605 1.26 1.13 1.00 11.36 165.95 0.30*** 
 Off Spike 2892 1.23 1.04 1.09 5.26 47.19 4325 1.10 1.05 0.36 9.16 148.09 0.14*** 
  All Years 3714 1.31 1.06 1.24 5.00 40.90 4930 1.12 1.06 0.49 15.45 404.93 0.19*** 
Years since IPO Spike 328 3.29 3.00 3.90 0.63 3.75 70 3.50 3.00 6.13 -0.22 2.76 -0.21 
 Off Spike 904 4.28 4.00 4.26 0.32 2.93 378 6.19 5.00 6.18 0.75 3.63 -1.91*** 
  All Years 1232 4.02 4.00 4.19 0.41 3.08 448 5.77 5.00 6.24 0.58 3.69 -1.75*** 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively  
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Table 2.3 Debt and Equity Financing Regression Estimates for publicly listed UK firms 
1996-2014 
The basic regression equations are LTDit = α + βFDit + e for debt financing and EQit = α + 
βFDit + e for equity financing.  Investment Spikes are defined as investments greater than 2 
times the median investment rate for each firm. LTD, change in long term debt, is defined as 
the ratio of change in total long-term debt to total assets. EQ, Net Equity Finance, is the 
difference between sale and purchase of equity. FD, Financing deficit = Investments + Change 
in working capital + Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. Investment = (Capital Expenditures + 
Increase in Investments + Acquisitions – sale of tangible fixed assets – sale of Investments – 
short term investments (increase) decrease – Investing Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change 
in working capital = (Cash and cash equivalents increase (decrease) - Accounts receivable 
decrease (increase) - Inventory decrease (increase) - Accounts payable and accrued liabilities 
increase (decrease) - Assets and Liabilities other net change - Financing activities other - 
current debt changes) / Total Assets. Dividends = Cash Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  
Internal Cash flow = (Income before extraordinary items (cash flow) + Extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) + Deferred 
taxes) cash flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax + Sale of property, plant and investments Gain 
(loss) + Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate effect) / Total assets. Computations are 
based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 
1996-2014. 1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Size 
(£ Million) adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using the CPI obtained from DataStream. 
Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  Spike 
Off 
Spike 
All 
Years Spike 
Off 
Spike 
All 
Years 
Financing Deficit 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.320*** 0.330*** 0.321*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.034) (0.016) (0.015) 
Constant 0.001  0.011***  0.011***  0.145***  0.078***  0.091***  
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.024) (0.005) (0.005) 
R2 0.031 0.012 0.017 0.229 0.224 0.218 
No. of Observations 3688 16427 20115 3688 16427 20115 
No. Of Firms 1399 1888 1888 1399 1888 1888 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 2.4 Debt and Equity Financing Regression against individual components of 
financing deficit for publicly listed UK firms 1996-2014 
The basic regression equations are LTDit = α + β1Iit + β2∆WCit + β3Dit - β4CFit + e for debt 
financing and EQit = α + β1Iit + β2∆WCit + β3Dit - β4CFit + e for equity financing.  Investment 
Spike is defined as investments greater than 2 times the median investment rate for each firm. 
LTD, change in long term debt, is defined as the ratio of change in total long-term debt to total 
assets. EQ, Net Equity Finance, is the difference between sale and purchase of equity. FD, 
Financing deficit = Investments + Change in working capital + Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. 
Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments + Acquisitions – sale of tangible 
fixed assets – sale of Investments – short term investments (increase) decrease – Investing 
Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change in working capital = (Cash and cash equivalents 
increase (decrease) - Accounts receivable decrease (increase) - Inventory decrease (increase) - 
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - Assets and Liabilities other net 
change - Financing activities other - current debt changes) / Total Assets. Dividends = Cash 
Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = (Income before extraordinary items 
(cash flow) + Extraordinary items and discontinued operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and 
amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) cash flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax + Sale of 
property, plant and investments Gain (loss) + Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate 
effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 1995 figures were used in estimating 
Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Size (£ Million) adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using 
the CPI obtained from DataStream. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are 
estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 
  Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off Spike All Years 
Investment 0.189***  0.117***  0.178***  0.619***  0.488***  0.485***  
 (0.026) (0.017) (0.013) (0.058) (0.035) (0.025) 
Change in Working 
Capital 
0.031***  0.028***  0.031***  0.396***  0.378***  0.381***  
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.034) (0.020) (0.017) 
Dividends -0.199  0.280***  0.219***  1.003***  0.944***  0.971***  
 (0.169) (0.064) (0.060) (0.375) (0.090) (0.093) 
Internal Cash Flow -0.019  -0.007  -0.011  -0.181***  -0.202***  -0.194***  
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.048) (0.023) (0.021) 
Constant -0.020*  0.006**  -0.001  0.107***  0.068***  0.077***  
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.023) (0.005) (0.005) 
R2 0.068 0.019 0.039 0.276 0.230 0.236 
No. of Observations 3688 16427 20115 3688 16427 20115 
No. Of Firms 1399 1888 1888 1399 1888 1888 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 2.5 Probit Regression of Debt and Equity Financing for publicly listed UK firms 
1996-2014 
The basic regression equations are Dit = α + βFDit + e for debt financing and Eit = α + βFDit + 
e for equity financing.  Investment Spike is defined as investments greater than 2 times the 
median investment rate for each firm. D, is the probability of employing debt financing, it takes 
the value of 1 if Change in long term debt > 0 and 0 otherwise. E, is the probability of employing 
equity financing, it takes the value of 1 if Net Equity Finance > 0 and 0 otherwise. FD, 
Financing deficit = Investments + Change in working capital + Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. 
Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments + Acquisitions – sale of tangible 
fixed assets – sale of Investments – short term investments (increase) decrease – Investing 
Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change in working capital = (Cash and cash equivalents 
increase (decrease) - Accounts receivable decrease (increase) - Inventory decrease (increase) - 
Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - Assets and Liabilities other net 
change - Financing activities other - current debt changes) / Total Assets. Dividends = Cash 
Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = (Income before extraordinary items 
(cash flow) + Extraordinary items and discontinued operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and 
amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) cash flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax + Sale of 
property, plant and investments Gain (loss) + Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate 
effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 1995 figures were used in estimating 
Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Size (£ Million) adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using 
the CPI obtained from DataStream. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are 
estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 
 Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off Spike All Years 
Financing 
Deficit 
0.232***  0.231***  0.304***  0.883***  1.017***  0.955***  
 (0.073) (0.046) (0.043) (0.108) (0.065) (0.060) 
Constant -0.525***  -0.419***  0.419***  0.592***  0.500***  0.551***  
 (0.206) (0.063) (0.058) (0.176) (0.760) (0.070) 
No. of 
Observations 
3688 16427 20115 3688 16427 20115 
No. Of Firms 1399 1888 1888 1399 1888 1888 
SE Clustered by 
Firm 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 2.6 Debt and Equity Financing Regression Estimates for Small and Large publicly listed UK firms 1996-2014 
The basic regression equations are LTDit = α + βFDit + e for debt financing and EQit = α + βFDit + e for equity financing.  Investment Spikes are defined as investments 
greater than 2 times the median investment rate for each firm. LTD, change in long term debt, is defined as the ratio of change in total long-term debt to total assets. EQ, 
Net Equity Finance, is the difference between sale and purchase of equity. FD, Financing deficit = Investments + Change in working capital + Dividend - Internal Cash 
Flow. Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments + Acquisitions – sale of tangible fixed assets – sale of Investments – short term investments (increase) 
decrease – Investing Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change in working capital = (Cash and cash equivalents increase (decrease) - Accounts receivable decrease (increase) 
- Inventory decrease (increase) - Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - Assets and Liabilities other net change - Financing activities other - current 
debt changes) / Total Assets. Dividends = Cash Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = (Income before extraordinary items (cash flow) + Extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) cash flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax + Sale of property, 
plant and investments Gain (loss) + Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Small firms are those with Total 
Assets (deflated by CPI) less than the 25th percentile of the distribution.  Size (£ Million) adjusted to constant 2014 pounds using the CPI obtained from DataStream. 
Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
Small Firms Large Firms  
Debt Financing Equity Financing Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off 
Spike 
All Years Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off 
Spike 
All Years 
Financing Deficit 0.025**  0.000  0.012*  0.361***  0.375***  0.357***  0.425***  0.230***  0.280***  0.224***  0.072***  0.101***  
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.045) (0.022) (0.020) (0.091) (0.032) (0.030) (0.044) (0.019) (0.016) 
Constant -0.023  -0.008  -0.018**  0.241***  0.149***  0.193***  -0.035  0.013  0.011  0.037**  0.023***  0.025***  
 (0.029) (0.007) (0.006) (0.090) (0.040) (0.030) (0.031) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.004) (0.004) 
R2 0.038 0.005 0.007 0.316 0.294 0.275 0.231 0.08 0.109 0.169 0.034 0.047 
No. of 
Observations 
1116 3510 4626 1116 3510 4626 607 4483 5090 607 4483 5090 
No. Of Firms 500 732 763 500 732 763 280 547 566 280 547 566 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by 
Firm 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 2.7 Debt and Equity Financing Regression against individual components of financing deficit for Small and Large publicly listed 
UK firms 1996-2014 
The basic regression equations are LTDit = α + β1Iit + β2∆WCit + β3Dit - β4CFit + e for debt financing and EQit = α + β1Iit + β2∆WCit + β3Dit - β4CFit + e for equity financing.   
Investment Spikes are defined as investments greater than 2 times the median investment rate for each firm. LTD, change in long term debt, is defined as the ratio of change in 
total long-term debt to total assets. EQ, Net Equity Finance, is the difference between sale and purchase of equity. FD, Financing deficit = Investments + Change in working 
capital + Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments + Acquisitions – sale of tangible fixed assets – sale of Investments – 
short term investments (increase) decrease – Investing Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change in working capital = (Cash and cash equivalents increase (decrease) - Accounts 
receivable decrease (increase) - Inventory decrease (increase) - Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - Assets and Liabilities other net change - Financing 
activities other - current debt changes) / Total Assets. Dividends = Cash Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = (Income before extraordinary items (cash 
flow) + Extraordinary items and discontinued operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) cash flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax 
+ Sale of property, plant and investments Gain (loss) + Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Small firms are those with 
Total Assets (deflated by CPI) less than the 25th percentile of the distribution. Size (£ Million) adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using the CPI obtained from DataStream. 
Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 Small Firms Large Firms 
 Debt Financing Equity Financing Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off Spike All Years 
Investment 0.114***  0.024  0.073***  0.751***  0.659***  0.640***  0.558***  0.448***  0.508***  0.161***  0.060**  0.113***  
 (0.039) (0.025) (0.020) (0.101) (0.061) (0.047) (0.081) (0.049) (0.033) (0.054) (0.030) (0.021) 
Change in Working Capital 0.029*  0.008  0.018**  0.420***  0.410***  0.400***  0.008  0.201***  0.168***  0.149  0.071**  0.093***  
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.045) (0.028) (0.023) (0.097) (0.034) (0.032) (0.094) (0.030) (0.030) 
Dividends -0.226  -0.078  -0.129  0.913  1.069***  1.116***  0.275  0.770***  0.703***  0.213  0.028  -0.001  
 (0.203) (0.183) (0.193) (0.635) (0.281) (0.266) (0.544) (0.118) (0.119) (0.383) (0.065) (0.085) 
Internal Cash Flow -0.016  0.016  -0.001  -0.235***  -0.243***  -0.227***  -0.467*  -0.125***  -0.139***  -0.166  -0.084***  -0.085***  
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.053) (0.027) (0.024) (0.243) (0.050) (0.047) (0.280) (0.024) (0.025) 
Constant -0.031  -0.008  -0.021***  0.221***  0.152***  0.186***  -0.046***  -0.004  -0.008  0.047*  0.027***  0.024***  
 (0.030) (0.006) (0.008) (0.067) (0.042) (0.032) (0.029) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004) 
R2 0.054 0.011 0.015 0.349 0.288 0.282 0.288 0.098 0.141 0.137 0.035 0.047 
No of Observations 1116 3510 4626 1116 3510 4626 607 4483 5090 607 4483 5090 
No of Companies 500 732 763 500 732 763 280 547 566 280 547 566 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Company Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
47 
 
Table 2.8 Probit Regression of Debt and Equity Financing for Small and Large publicly listed UK firms 1996-2014 
The basic regression equations are Dit = α + βFDit + e for debt financing and Eit = α + βFDit + e for equity financing.  Investment Spikes are defined as investments greater than 
2 times the median investment rate for each firm. D, is the probability of employing debt financing, it takes the value of 1 if Change in long term debt > 0 and 0 otherwise. E, 
is the probability of employing equity financing, it takes the value of 1 if Net Equity Finance > 0 and 0 otherwise. FD, Financing deficit = Investments + Change in working 
capital + Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments + Acquisitions – sale of tangible fixed assets – sale of Investments – 
short term investments (increase) decrease – Investing Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change in working capital = (Cash and cash equivalents increase (decrease) - Accounts 
receivable decrease (increase) - Inventory decrease (increase) - Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - Assets and Liabilities other net change - Financing 
activities other - current debt changes) / Total Assets. Dividends = Cash Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = (Income before extraordinary items (cash 
flow) + Extraordinary items and discontinued operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) cash flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax 
+ Sale of property, plant and investments Gain (loss) + Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Small firms are those with 
Total Assets in the bottom quartile of the distribution. Size (£ Million) adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using the CPI obtained from DataStream. Financial firms and utilities 
are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
                Small Firms Large Firms  
 Debt Financing Equity Financing Debt Financing Equity Financing  
  Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off Spike All Years Spike Off Spike All Years  
Financing Deficit 0.100  0.120**  0.134***  0.852***  1.051***  0.930***  2.824***  2.019***  2.271***  1.859***  1.244***  1.434***  
 
 (0.079) (0.061) (0.051) (0.122) (0.078) (0.070) (0.595) (0.307) (0.284) (0.650) (0.256) (0.224)  
Constant -0.861**  -1.630***  -1.377***  0.007  0.088  0.142  -0.767**  -1.141***  -0.176**  2.194***  0.650***  0.736***  
 
 (0.391) (0.400) (0.259) (0.402) (0.276) (0.221) (0.373) (0.088) (0.085) (0.612) (0.117) (0.113)  
No. of Observations 1153 3670 4823 1153 3670 4823 638 4662 5300 638 4662 5300  
No. Of Firms 516 749 778 516 749 778 292 572 592 292 572 592  
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket)  
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Table 2.9 Debt and Equity Financing Regression Estimates for Small and Large publicly listed UK firms during investment spikes 1996-
2014 
The basic regression equations are LTDit = α + βFDit + e for debt financing and EQit = α + βFDit + e for equity financing.  Investment Spikes are 
defined as investments greater than 2 times the median investment rate for each firm. LTD, change in long term debt, is defined as the ratio of 
change in total long-term debt to total assets. EQ, Net Equity Finance, is the difference between sale and purchase of equity. FD, Financing deficit 
= Investments + Change in working capital + Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments + 
Acquisitions – sale of tangible fixed assets – sale of Investments – short term investments (increase) decrease – Investing Activities Other) / Total 
Assets. Change in working capital = (Cash and cash equivalents increase (decrease) - Accounts receivable decrease (increase) - Inventory decrease 
(increase) - Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - Assets and Liabilities other net change - Financing activities other - 
current debt changes) / Total Assets. Dividends = Cash Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = (Income before extraordinary 
items (cash flow) + Extraordinary items and discontinued operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) 
cash flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax + Sale of property, plant and investments Gain (loss) + Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate 
effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. We 
define crisis periods as years 2001 to 2002 and 2007 to 2009. All other years within the sample period are defined as non-crisis periods. 1995 
figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Small firms are those with Total Assets (deflated b CPI) less than the 25th 
percentile of the distribution.  Size (£ Million) adjusted to constant 2014 pounds using the CPI obtained from DataStream. Financial firms and 
utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
  Small Firms                                                                   Large Firms 
                                                   Debt                                Equity                                     Debt                                 Equity 
  Crisis 
Non-
Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis Crisis 
Non-
Crisis Crisis Non-Crisis 
Financing Deficit 0.056**  0.032*  0.228***  0.404***  0.792***  0.277**  0.244**  0.264***  
 (0.028) (0.019) (0.086) (0.067) (0.133) (0.119) (0.100) (0.087) 
Constant -0.003  -0.022  0.577***  0.294***  -0.136***  -0.001  -0.019  0.042**  
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.060) (0.056) (0.053) (0.033) (0.019) (0.019) 
R2 0.0574 0.0508 0.2894 0.3311 0.5040 0.1732 0.2479 0.1723 
No. of Observations 431 722 431 722 208 430 208 430 
No. Of Firms 293 418 293 418 152 244 152 244 
49 
 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Figure 2.1 Debt, Equity Financing and Financing Deficit for Small and Large UK Firms 1996-2014 
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Figure 2.2 Trends in Investment Spikes for Small and Large UK Firms 1996-2014 
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Table 2.10 Description of Variables 
Variable Proxy Compustat Variables 
Investment (Capital Expenditures+ Increase in 
Investments + Acquisitions - Sale of 
Tangible Fixed Assets – Sale of 
Investments – Short term investments 
(Increase)/Decrease – Investing 
Activities-Other  /  Total Assets 
CAPX: capital expenditures; IVCH -- 
Increase in Investments; AQC: 
acquisitions; STFIXA—Sale of 
Tangible Fixed Assets; SIV -- Sale of 
Investments; STINV -- Short Term 
Investments - (Increase)/Decrease; 
IVACO – Investing Activities – Other; 
AT: Assets - Total 
Investment 
Spike 
Investment / Median Investment > 2   
Change in 
Long Term 
Debt Finance 
(Total Long-Term Debt at t - Total 
Long-Term Debt at t-1) / Total Assets 
DLTT -- Long-Term Debt - Total 
Net Equity 
Finance 
(Sale of Common and Preferred Stock - 
Purchase of Common and Preferred 
Stock) / Total Assets 
SSTK - sale of Common and Preferred 
Stock; PRSTKC - purchase of 
Common and Preferred Stock 
Change in 
Working 
Capital 
Cash and Cash Equivalents-
Increase/(Decrease) – Accounts 
Receivable-Decrease (Increase) – 
Inventory-Decrease (Increase) – 
Accounts Payable and accrued 
liabilities-Increase/(Decrease) – Assets 
and Liabilities Other-Net Change – 
Financing Activities-Other – Current 
Debt Changes / Total Assets 
CHECH -- Cash and Cash Equivalents 
- Increase/(Decrease); RECCH – 
Accounts Receivable – Decrease 
(Increase); INVCH -- Inventory – 
Decrease (Increase); APALCH – 
Accounts Payable and Accrued 
Liabilities – Increase/(Decrease);  
AOLOCH -- Assets and Liabilities - 
Other - Net Change; FIAO – 
Financing Activities – Other;  DLCCH 
-- Current Debt - Changes 
Dividends Cash Dividends (Cash Flow) / Total 
Assets 
DV -- Cash Dividends (Cash Flow) 
Internal Cash 
Flow 
(Income Before Extraordinary Items 
(Cash Flow) + Extraordinary Items and 
Discontinued Operations (Cash Flow) + 
Depreciation and Amortization (Cash 
Flow) + Deferred Taxes (Cash Flow) + 
Equity in Earnings after Tax + Sale of 
Property Plant and Investments-
Gain(loss) + Funds from 
operations(other) + Exchange Rate 
Effect) / Total Assets 
IBC -- Income Before Extraordinary 
Items (Cash Flow);  XIDOC --  
Extraordinary Items and Discontinued 
Operations (Cash Flow); DPC – 
Depreciation and Amortization (Cash 
Flow); TXDC – Deferred Taxes (Cash 
Flow); EIEA -- Equity in Earnings - 
After-Tax; SPPIV -- Sale of Property, 
Plant and Equipment and Investments 
- Gain (Loss); FOPO -- Funds from 
Operations – Other; EXRE – 
Exchange Rate Effect   
Financing 
Deficit  
Investment + Change in Working 
Capital + Dividends – Internal Cash 
Flow 
 
Growth Sales/Turnover (Net) at t / 
Sales/Turnover (Net) at t-1 
SALE—Sales/Turnover (Net) 
53 
 
Tangibility Property, Plant and Equipment-Total 
(Net) / Total Assets 
PPENT—Property, Plant and 
Equipment – Total (Net) 
Years Since 
IPO 
Current Year – IPO Year IPODATE—Company Initial Public 
Offering Date; FYEAR—Data Year -
Fiscal 
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APPENDIX 2.A 
Table 2.11.A1 Pair-wise correlation matrix 
 (p values in parentheses) 
  Debt 
Financing 
Equity 
Financing 
Financing 
Deficit 
Investment Change in 
Working 
Capital 
Internal 
Cash Flow 
Dividends 
Debt Financing 1.00 
      
Equity 
Financing 
-0.05  1.00 
     
 (0.00)       
Financing 
Deficit 
0.10  
 
0.52    1.00 
    
 (0.00) (0.00)      
Investment 0.18  
 
0.14   0.26      1.00 
   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Change in 
Working 
Capital 
0.05  
 
0.23   0.45     -0.07         1.00 
  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Internal Cash 
Flow 
0.00  
 
-0.34  -0.61    0.08          0.23         1.00 
 
 (0.97) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Dividends 0.00  
 
-0.12  -0.08    -0.00        0.00         0.18  1.00 
 (0.82) (0.00) (0.00) (0.79) (0.80) (0.00)  
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Table 2.12.A2 Diagnostic Test – Hausman Test 
The basic regression equation is EQit = α + β1Iit + β2∆WCit + β3Dit - β4CFit + e for equity 
financing.  Investment Spike is defined as investments greater than 2 times the median 
investment rate for each firm. EQ, Net Equity Finance, is the difference between sale and 
purchase of equity. FD, Financing deficit = Investments + Change in working capital + 
Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments 
+ Acquisitions – sale of tangible fixed assets – sale of Investments – short term investments 
(increase) decrease – Investing Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change in working capital = 
(Cash and cash equivalents increase (decrease) - Accounts receivable decrease (increase) - 
Inventory decrease (increase) - Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - 
Assets and Liabilities other net change - Financing activities other - current debt changes) / 
Total Assets. Dividends = Cash Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = 
(Income before extraordinary items (cash flow) + Extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) cash 
flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax + Sale of property, plant and investments Gain (loss) + 
Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based 
on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 
1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Size (£ Million) 
adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using the CPI obtained from DataStream. Financial firms 
and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 (b) (B) (b-B)  sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 fixed random Difference S.E  
Investments 0.485 0.484 0.001 0.001  
Change in Working 
Capital 0.381 0.384 -0.003 0.000  
Dividends 0.971 0.412 0.559 0.021  
Internal Cash flow -0.194 -0.263 0.069 0.002  
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
      
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic  
      
                 chi2(22) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)   
                          =     1387.58     
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000    
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)   
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Table 2.13.A3 Diagnostic Test – Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
The basic regression equation is EQit = α + β1Iit + β2∆WCit + β3Dit - β4CFit + e for equity 
financing.  Investment Spike is defined as investments greater than 2 times the median 
investment rate for each firm. EQ, Net Equity Finance, is the difference between sale and 
purchase of equity. FD, Financing deficit = Investments + Change in working capital + 
Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments 
+ Acquisitions – sale of tangible fixed assets – sale of Investments – short term investments 
(increase) decrease – Investing Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change in working capital = 
(Cash and cash equivalents increase (decrease) - Accounts receivable decrease (increase) - 
Inventory decrease (increase) - Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - 
Assets and Liabilities other net change - Financing activities other - current debt changes) / 
Total Assets. Dividends = Cash Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = 
(Income before extraordinary items (cash flow) + Extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) cash 
flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax + Sale of property, plant and investments Gain (loss) + 
Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based 
on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 
1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Size (£ Million) 
adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using the CPI obtained from DataStream. Financial firms 
and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation    
    F(  1,    1886) =    100.705     
           Prob > F =      0.0000     
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Table 2.14.A4 Diagnostic Test – Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in 
fixed effect regression model 
The basic regression equation is EQit = α + β1Iit + β2∆WCit + β3Dit - β4CFit + e for equity 
financing.  Investment Spike is defined as investments greater than 2 times the median 
investment rate for each firm. EQ, Net Equity Finance, is the difference between sale and 
purchase of equity. FD, Financing deficit = Investments + Change in working capital + 
Dividend - Internal Cash Flow. Investment = (Capital Expenditures + Increase in Investments 
+ Acquisitions – sale of tangible fixed assets – sale of Investments – short term investments 
(increase) decrease – Investing Activities Other) / Total Assets. Change in working capital = 
(Cash and cash equivalents increase (decrease) - Accounts receivable decrease (increase) - 
Inventory decrease (increase) - Accounts payable and accrued liabilities increase (decrease) - 
Assets and Liabilities other net change - Financing activities other - current debt changes) / 
Total Assets. Dividends = Cash Dividends (Cash flow) / Total Assets.  Internal Cash flow = 
(Income before extraordinary items (cash flow) + Extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (cash flow) + Depreciation and amortization (cash flow) + Deferred taxes) cash 
flow) + Equity in Earnings after tax + Sale of property, plant and investments Gain (loss) + 
Funds from operations (other) + Exchange rate effect) / Total assets.  Computations are based 
on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1996-2014. 
1995 figures were used in estimating Change in Long Term Debt Financing. Size (£ Million) 
adjusted to constant 2014 Pounds using the CPI obtained from DataStream. Financial firms 
and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (1888)  =  2.1e+07 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Chapter 3 Private Firms Financing Constraints and 
Investment Spikes 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Private firms are a significant part of the UK economy. According to Brav (2009), private firms 
represent about 97.5% of all incorporated UK firms with more than 66% share of all corporate 
assets. This point to the importance of understanding the funding dynamics of these firms based 
on the crucial roles they play in the overall economy of the UK.  
In a comparative empirical analysis of funding patterns of public and private firms, Brav (2009) 
found that private firms are almost entirely debt financed. He attributed this to a relatively more 
costly private equity resulting from a relatively higher level of information asymmetry and the 
reluctance of private firms to dilute their level of control.  We extend this study by 
distinguishing between constrained and unconstrained private firms. This is against the 
background of the implication of the pecking order theory that firms with the greatest level of 
financing deficit will specialise in equity.  
In our first paper, and in line with Frank and Goyal (2007), we find that equity plays a more 
significant role in smaller public firms financing mix than that suggested by the pecking order 
theory. This is significant as smaller firms should normally have a greater level of information 
asymmetry. We extend this study by looking at constrained private firms who, arguably, should 
have the greatest level of information asymmetry compared to any type of public firm and 
unconstrained private firms. Our primary motivation is to see if, when new debt and equity are 
considered, private firms in general and constrained private firms in particular, can be said to 
be almost entirely financed by debt as suggested by Brav (2009).  
 
The paper examines the determinants of leverage ratios of private UK firms distinguishing 
between funding dynamics of constrained and unconstrained private UK firms. Furthermore, 
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we examine the relationship between changes in financing deficit and/or its component and 
changes in new debt and equity financing for these groups of firms. We look at the differences 
between these relationships during periods of financial crisis versus non-crisis periods. We also 
examine these interactions during periods of investment spikes. We will therefore attempt to 
answer a number of questions. Are funding dynamics of constrained private firms any different 
from their unconstrained counterparts? How do constrained and unconstrained private firms 
raise new capital to fund huge investments? We further extend the analysis by examining 
changes before and after the global financial crisis. Our analysis is based on a sample of private 
UK firms in the FAME database from 2000 to 2017.  
We find that traditional determinants of leverage have varying influences on constrained and 
unconstrained private firms. The widest differences relate to the influence of Growth and Size 
and, to a limited extent, Age. While growth has a positive and significant effect on leverage for 
unconstrained firms, it is negative and not statistically significant for constrained firms. The 
opposite is the case for size which has a negative and significant relationship for constrained 
firms but a positive and insignificant near zero influence on unconstrained firms. While age 
goes in the same direction for both types of firms, it is only in the case of unconstrained firms 
that it is negative and not significant. This is consistent with a limited access of constrained 
private firms to borrowing due to their smaller size and younger age when compared with their 
unconstrained counterparts. This may also limit growth opportunities constrained firms can 
take advantage of due to limited funds.  
Furthermore, when the analysis is repeated for periods when both types of firms face huge 
investments, we find that leverage ratios of constrained firms are generally nonresponsive to 
changes in traditional determinants of leverage ratios. This contrasts with unconstrained firms 
who show the expected highly significant negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage ratios. We attribute this to a relatively higher level of information asymmetry of 
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constrained private firms. Our results also show that, when faced with financing deficits, 
constrained firms make changes to their equity holdings while unconstrained firms make 
changes to their debt holdings. This again points to information asymmetry limiting the ability 
of constrained firms to address financing deficits by changing the mix of their debt holdings. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; Section two examines the related theoretical and 
empirical papers. Section three describes the data and lays out the methodology to be employed 
in our analysis. Section four involves a presentation and analysis of results of our empirical 
analysis while section five concludes the paper.  
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Private firms, by their nature have limited access to public capital markets and this greatly 
influences the financing mix employed in their capital structure. Studies on capital structure 
have generally been underpinned by the major capital structure theories; the trade-off theory 
(TOT) and the Pecking order theory (POT). As earlier highlighted in the introductory chapter, 
the TOT implies that firms continually “trade-off” benefits of debt, including its tax 
deductibility against costs like bankruptcy and agency costs. Firms thus have an optimal capital 
structure to which they revert in times of temporary deviations. (Fama and French 2002; Myers, 
2001) On the other hand, the POT holds that the existence of information asymmetry results in 
the undervaluation of stocks based on their degree of sensitivity to information asymmetry. 
The POT also implies that there is no optimal capital structure and financing deficit is the key 
driver of the capital structure choices of firms (Fama and French 2002; Harris and Raviv, 1991; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Brav (2009) carried out a comparative analysis of the capital structure choices of public and 
private firms against the background of the major capital structure theories. He concluded that 
private firms are almost exclusively financed by debt with greater amounts of leverage in their 
financing mix when compared with their public counterparts. However, when viewed from the 
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perspective of the POT, private firms should be expected to have relatively greater levels of 
information asymmetry. This is due to the less stringent reporting requirements they face and 
limited access to investors, especially equity investors, in participating in their financing. 
Private firms should therefore arguably be mostly financed by internal funds. This should 
especially be the case if they have to finance huge investments with relatively higher levels of 
financing deficits. This was partially addressed by Brav (2009) with an inclusion of a separate 
analysis of debt financing against financing deficits and its components. His conclusions 
however remained unchanged. He however excluded firms classified as small by the UK 
Companies Act. We include these firms in our analysis as Frank and Goyal (2003) show that 
excluding the smallest of firms has a non-trivial effect on results obtained in a similar analysis. 
Furthermore, we extend the study by examining if financing patterns are the same for 
constrained and unconstrained private firms and how these dynamics are affected by the 
occurrence of huge investments.  
3.2.1 FINANCING CONSTRAINT 
A number of studies have examined the capital structure of financially constrained firms mainly 
within the context of public firms. Firms have been grouped into constrained and unconstrained 
firms on a number of bases. Financing constrains has also been cited as the rationale behind 
some firms’ zero-leverage behaviour (Bessler et. al, 2013; Dang, 2013). Different bases have 
included Commercial paper rating (Calomiris et. al, 1995); total assets (Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995); dividend payments (Fazzari et. al, 1988); Bond rating (Cummins et. al, 
1999) and tangibility of assets (Almeida and Campello, 2007). Almeida and Campello (2007) 
found that investments of financially constrained firms are more sensitive to their internal cash 
flows the more tangible their assets are. Other studies have used a combination of measures to 
identify financially constrained firms. One such study is that of Hadlock and Pierce (2010) who 
used a weighted average of age and size of the company. Financially constrained firms are 
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defined using the HP Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) as firms in the top quartile of the Index 
given as; 
HP = − 0.737 ∗ SIZE + 0.043 ∗ SIZE2 − 0.04 ∗ age     (1) 
We adopt this measure in this study as it is more applicable to private firms and uses more than 
one measure. 
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) should imply private firms experience a 
reverse pecking order due to their limited access to external capital. This will be the case as 
they have relatively less stringent reporting requirements when compared with their publicly 
listed peers. Indeed, in line with Frank and Goyal (2003) we had found in paper one that the 
pecking order theory mainly applies to large public firms who address financing deficit by 
raising new debt. Smaller public firms were found to respond to financing deficit by raising 
relatively more equity. We should therefor expect that private firms and especially constrained 
private firms, will address financing deficits by raising new equity. We would next examine 
some implications of the pecking order theory related to our study. 
3.2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We examine some implications for constrained private firms flowing from the literature. The 
first implication is that constrained private firms will specialise in equity financing. 
Implication 1: Constrained private firms will specialise in equity financing. 
The pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Frank and Goyal 2003), though arguably 
focused on public firms could be extended to private firms in this context. It would be expected that 
constrained private firms will have a higher level of information asymmetry and therefore will find it 
more difficult to raise external capital, especially debt capital, relative to their unconstrained 
counterparts. Thus, constrained private firms will be expected to rely first on internal funds, followed 
by equity financing and then debt financing in some form of reverse pecking order. We will therefore 
expect that a higher level of profit will have a relatively less negative effect on levels of leverage for 
constrained firms when compared to their unconstrained counterparts. Furthermore, we will expect that 
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increases in financing deficit will have little or no effect on new debt financing for constrained firms 
but will have a positive effect on new equity financing which leads to the second implication we will 
be investigating. 
Implication 2: During periods of Investment Spikes Constrained private firms will be less 
responsive to debt financing than their unconstrained counterparts. 
Periods of investment spikes will combine a high level of information asymmetry with a high 
level of financing deficit for unconstrained private firms. We will therefore expect that 
unconstrained firms become even less responsive to debt financing at this period especially 
when placed alongside their unconstrained counterparts. Therefore, for constrained firms, most 
of the traditional determinants of leverage should be less responsive to changes in leverage at 
this period. We would also expect that new debt and equity will be less responsive to changes 
in financing deficit especially for constrained firms as they may be forced to rely on internal 
funds at this period. 
3.3 DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
The study is based on a sample of all private UK firms in the Fame database from 2000 to 
2017. This period was chosen to enable us observe funding dynamics across different crises 
and non-crises periods. Clustered fixed effect panel data regression is used for the analysis. We 
exclude firms in the financial services and utility sectors (SIC codes 6000s, 4900 – 4999 
respectively) due to the peculiar nature of their financing mix (Whited 2006). Constrained firms 
are classified as firms in the fourth quartile of the HP index while unconstrained firms are in 
the first quartile. (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). Total assets are adjusted using the UK consumer 
price index obtained from the World banks development indicators. Data is winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentile to adjust for outliers. Observations with missing key variables are 
excluded from the analysis. A number of diagnostic tests were carried out. Detailed results are 
in Appendix 3A. Hausman test results indicate that fixed effects panel regression was more 
appropriate than random effects for the regression analyses. Furthermore, this study carries out 
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Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and Modified Wald test for group-wise 
heteroscedasticity. Results indicate the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. We, 
therefore, use robust standard errors, clustered by firm. 
The final sample comprises 48,091 firms with 417,389 firm years of which 51,794 are for 
constrained firms and 149,094 are for unconstrained firms. The difference in firm years 
between constrained and unconstrained firms can be attributed to the relatively less data 
availability of constrained firms which are on the average smaller firms (Brav 2009). 
3.3.1 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The initial analysis is aimed at distinguishing the financing patterns of constrained and 
unconstrained private firms using traditional determinants of capital structure (Brav 2009). The 
basic regression equation is as follows; 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =      𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (2) 
Where D = Leverage ratio. P = Return on assets. G = Growth rate. S= Size and A = Number of 
years since incorporation. Table 3.13.B1 provides a more detailed description of variables. 
Next, we follow Frank and Goyal (2003) by adding the financing deficit variable to the equation 
as follows; 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =      𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (3) 
Following Frank and Goyal (2013) we define Financing deficit as follows; 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =      𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       (4) 
Where FD = Financing Deficit, I = Investment, Dv = Dividends, WC = Working Capital and 
CF = Cash Flow. 
We proceed with the analyses by carrying out a regression of debt and equity against financing 
deficit. Thus, the regression equation is as follows; 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =      𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (5) 
65 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =      𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (6) 
Where Df is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Leverage – Lagged Leverage) / 
Lagged Leverage is greater than 5% and zero otherwise. Ef is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if (Issued Capital – Lagged Issued capital) / Lagged Issued Capital id greater than 
5% and zero otherwise. 
However, as earlier highlighted, the limitation of this approach is the possible existence of 
endogeneity as the debt financing is likely to be influenced by level of equity financing and 
vice versa. 
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) suggests that high quality firms will 
respond to increases in financing deficit unaddressed by internal funds by adjusting their debt 
financing while lower quality firms will address deficits with equity. We should therefore 
expect our results to indicate that changes in financing deficit leads to changes in equity 
financing for constrained private firms and debt financing for their unconstrained counterparts. 
Next, we present and analyse results of our regression estimates. 
3.4 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
3.4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics of firms included in the sample are presented in Table 3.1. Figure 3.1 
shows trends in financing deficit, debt and equity financing of constrained and unconstrained 
private UK firms from 2000 to 2017. Figure 3.2 shows trends in investment spikes for 
constrained and unconstrained firms revealing a difference in the average trends for these firms 
and further justifying a closer examination of their financing dynamics. 
It can be observed that constrained private firms are, on the average, much more highly 
leveraged than their unconstrained counterparts (49% and 37% of total assets respectively). 
Thus, the observation made by Brav (2009) that private firms are heavily debt financed is most 
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relevant to constrained private firms. Furthermore, this is consistent with Joeveer (2013) that 
unconstrained firms are relatively less reliant on debt. Return on assets is higher among 
unconstrained firms at 9% of total assets to 3% for constrained firms. This could be due to the 
relatively heavier interest burdens that constrained firms may have to bear, given their 
relatively higher debt levels. Consistent with Evans (1987), constrained private firms have a 
higher turnover growth at 1.13 times previous turnover as compared with 1.08 times for 
unconstrained firms. This is possibly due to their smaller size and younger age as they are less 
likely to be mature firms. As should be expected, unconstrained firms are much bigger with an 
average of £106.47 inflation adjusted total assets. A very wide gap from their constrained 
counterparts with a mere £1.96 average inflation adjusted total assets. Furthermore, 
unconstrained firms are older with an average age of 3.54 years since date of incorporation as 
compared to their constrained counterparts’ 2.07 years. These differences between constrained 
and unconstrained private firms point to possible differences in what drives their financing mix. 
This will be explored in our regression analysis. 
We can also observe from the descriptive statistics differences related to raising new debt and 
equity. On the average, while unconstrained firms raise new debt of about 6% more debt than 
in the previous year constrained firms on the average retire debt by 6% year to year. This should 
be expected as unconstrained firms will normally find it much easier to raise new capital given 
their bigger size, tangible assets and older age. New equity issues are relatively smaller than 
new debt issues for unconstrained firms with about 4% increase on the average. However, 
constrained firms are able to raise only about 2% new equity from the previous period. Again, 
we would expect constrained firms to be relatively less attractive in all types of capital markets 
for similar reasons as with new debt issue. However, we note that constrained firms on average 
increase equity financing and reduce debt financing. We proceed with the analysis by running 
a regression of leverage against traditional determinants of capital structure. 
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3.4.2 ANALYSIS OF REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
3.4.2.1 Leverage Regression against Traditional Capital Structure Determinants  
We first run the leverage regression against traditional determinants of capital structure as seen 
in Appendix Table 3.12.B2. 
Results indicate a negative and significant relationship between profitability and leverage ratio 
of private firms on the average (-0.44). However, when considered separately unconstrained 
firms leverage ratio are much more sensitive to profitability (-0.47) than their constrained 
counterparts (-0.28). This is probably due to their relatively better position in raising all types 
of capital. They can thus take more advantage of increased profitability to rebalance their 
financing mix to a greater extent than can their unconstrained counterparts. Age also has a 
significant positive relationship with leverage for all private firms on the average (0.03). 
However, when considered separately, constrained and unconstrained firms seem to borrow 
less the older they are (-0.03 and -0.07 respectively) Results for constrained firms are however 
not statistically significant. Age is thus a more important factor for unconstrained firms than 
their constrained counterparts.  
Growth is a positive determinant of leverage ratio for private firms (0.01). However, the 
influence of growth on leverage ratio for constrained firms is not statistically significant. 
Possibly due to their relatively less capacity to employ leverage to address their growth 
demands. Tangibility of assets also exerts a positive influence on the leverage of private firms 
(0.15). However, leverage of constrained firms appears to me more sensitive to changes in 
tangible assets than that of their unconstrained counterparts. This should be expected as 
descriptive statistics indicate that constrained firms are younger with far less assets on the 
average. Tangibility thus becomes a necessary comfort for lenders in providing lending 
facilities to constrained firms. Results indicate that size has a negative influence on leverage 
for all private firms on the average (-0.04) for constrained firms (-0.15) results for 
unconstrained firms are not statistically significant. 
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Results are consistent with constrained private firms having relatively more limited access to 
borrowing due to their smaller size, less tangible assets and younger age when compared with 
their unconstrained counterparts. We proceed with the analysis by introducing the financing 
deficit variable into the equation. We also see the effect of financing deficit on new debt and 
equity financing for all types of private firms. 
3.4.2.2 Debt and Equity Regression against Financing Deficit  
Regression results are presented in Table 3.2. It can be observed that results remain 
qualitatively similar even with the introduction of the financing deficit variable. Thus, even 
though the variable is positive and significant in all instances, it does not impact the magnitude 
of significance of traditional variables to any reasonable extent. On average, financing deficit 
has a positive and significant impact (0.05) on leverage for private firms. However, when firms 
are split into constrained and unconstrained firms, we see a much smaller impact on constrained 
firms (0.04) when compared to unconstrained firms (0.06). These points to the relatively lower 
ability of constrained firms to increase leverage due to their smaller size, younger age and less 
tangible assets. We next examine the impact of financing deficit on the acquisition of new debt 
and equity for constrained and unconstrained firms. Results are presented in Table 3.3. 
Results indicate a negative relationship between financing deficit and new debt issue for UK 
private firms at -0.11 on the average. However, the relationship between financing deficit and 
new equity issue is 0.01. Though coefficients indicate a small magnitude, it would appear that 
that when faced with gaps in their financing mix, UK private firms on the average raise new 
equity and in fact reduce new debt. When decomposed into constrained and unconstrained 
firms, it can be observed that while there is also a negative relationship between new debt and 
financing deficit for unconstrained firms, the relationship for constrained firms is not 
statistically significant. Conversely, the positive relationship between new equity finance and 
financing deficit persists for constrained firms while that of unconstrained firms, tough 
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positive, is not statistically significant. This seems to suggest that unconstrained firms, on 
average are sensitive to new debt when there are financing deficits while unconstrained firms 
are more sensitive to new equity. This is probably due to the fact that equity is more sensitive 
to information asymmetry and thus constrained firms with younger age, less tangible assets 
and less profitability may need to specialize in equity to address funding gaps in their financing 
mix. We are next interested in what happens to the financing mix when there is a higher than 
usual level of investment for all types of private firms. 
3.4.2.3 Huge versus Regular Investments 
We examine the funding pattern of constrained and unconstrained private firms when faced 
with larger than usual investments. Following Whited (2006) we define huge investments as 
follows; 
Isit = Iit / Median Iit1-tn > 2     (5) 
Where Is = investment spike, I = investment, t is time index, and i is firm index 
Results obtained from our panel regression are presented in Appendix Table 3.13.B3. 
Results for periods of huge investments indicate that on the average, the effect of size and age 
as determinants of capital structure loses statistical significance. Suggesting that when private 
firms are faced with greater than usual investments, profitability, growth and tangibility of 
assets are the key determinants of the capital structure. This is reasonable as huge investments 
may coincide with an increased risk profile of the firms requiring lenders to emphasize more 
tangible measures over relationship. Regular investments are however closer to results derived 
in Appendix Table 3.12.B2 where all periods are combined except that age is also not 
significant at this time as well.  
When private firms are spilt into constrained and unconstrained firms, we see that the effects 
on all the variables disappear for constrained firms implying that when faced with huge 
investments it may be more difficult for constrained firms to increase their leverage irrespective 
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of their level of profitability, growth, tangible assets, age and size. For unconstrained firms, 
results indicate that profitability is the key driver of changes in leverage during times of huge 
investments. During regular investments the influencer of the level of leverage appears to be 
size for constrained firms while unconstrained firms react to profitability, growth and 
tangibility. Again, we introduce the financing deficit variable into the mix and examine its 
effects on all types of private firms. Results are reported in Table 3.4. 
We observe that, for all private firms on the average, there is a limited impact on all other 
variables when the financing deficit variable is introduced either during huge or regular 
investments. The financing deficit variable itself is positive and significant more so during huge 
investments (0.07) than during regular investments (0.06). However, for constrained firms, 
while effects are essentially similar to results in Appendix Table 3.13.B3, during huge 
investments, tangibility becomes a slightly significant determinant of leverage. For 
unconstrained firms, the financing deficit variable is positive and significant whether the firm 
is experiencing huge or regular investments. Thus, it appears that financing deficit is more of 
a driver of leverage for unconstrained firms than for constrained firms. We next examine the 
influence of financing deficit on the acquisition of new debt and equity during periods of huge 
and regular investments. Results are reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
 
It can be observed form Tables 3.5 and 3.6 that during periods of huge investments financing 
deficits has a negative and significant impact on new debt financing for all firms considered 
together and for unconstrained firms considered separately. The effect on constrained firms is 
not significant. New equity financing is generally not significant for all categories of firms. 
However, during periods of regular investments, there is a positive and significant relationship 
between financing deficit and new equity for all firms considered together. Thus, it would 
appear that the effects observed Table 3.3 when all periods are aggregated do not necessarily 
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hold when periods of huge and regular investments are isolated except for the similarity of 
financing deficit having a positive and significant effect on new equity financing when all 
periods are considered together as well as during periods of regular investments. The next 
analysis looks at the behaviour of private firms during periods of financial crises. 
3.4.2.4 Capital Structure and Financial Crisis.  
The response of leverage ratio to changes in traditional determinants of capital structure for 
private UK firms during crisis and non-crisis periods are detailed in Appendix Table 3.14.B4. 
Periods of financial crisis in our data base are 2007 to 2009 while 2000 to 2006 and 2010 to 
2017 are classified as non-crisis periods. 
It can be observed that, during financial crisis, changes in profitability have a negative and 
significant relationship with leverage for all types of private UK firms on the average (-0.27) 
as well as for constrained (-0.16) and unconstrained firms (-0.31) considered separately. 
Similarly, during non-financial crisis periods, profitability has a negative and significant 
relationship with debt financing for all types of UK private firms albeit at a higher magnitude. 
(-0.45, -0.29 and -0.48 for all, constrained and unconstrained firms respectively). This possibly 
points to the relative ease of raising leverage during non-crisis periods when compared with 
crisis periods for UK private firms. Our results also indicate that higher growth prospects lead 
to higher leverage only during non-crisis periods for all private firms on the average and for 
unconstrained private firms. Relationship with leverage during crisis periods and for 
constrained firms during non-crisis periods is not statistically significant. There is a positive 
relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage for all UK private firms on the average 
during crisis. This also applies to unconstrained firms. However, relationship with 
unconstrained firms is positive but not statistically significant. This relationship is uniformly 
positive across board during non-crisis periods. The effect of size of leverage is uniformly 
negative during crises and non-crisis periods. However, for unconstrained firms, this effect is 
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positive during financial crisis and not significant during non-crisis periods. Next, we examine 
introduce financing deficit into the model and present results in Table 3.7.  
We notice from Table 3.7 that the introduction of financing deficit has minimal impact on the 
magnitude and significance of the variables. Financing deficit however has a positive and 
significant impact on leverage across all types of private firms and all periods. This is more the 
case for unconstrained firms than for constrained firms. We proceed with the analysis by 
examining the changes in new debt and equity financing as a result of changes in the Financing 
deficit during crisis and non-crisis periods. We present results in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the relationship between changes in financing deficit and changes in 
debt and equity financing during crisis and non-crisis periods respectively. Our figures show 
that while a negative and significant relationship between financing deficit and new debt during 
crisis periods for unconstrained firms and for all firms considered together. However, during 
non-crises periods while there is a negative and significant relationship between financing 
deficit and new debt for UK private firms, the relationship is positive and significant for new 
equity financing. For constrained firms, the influence of financing deficit is generally not 
significant for new debt or new equity either during crisis or non-crises periods.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The study has focused on how constrained UK private firms fund investments especially when 
there is a simultaneous incidence of financing constraint and high levels of investments. Our 
results indicate that determinants of leverage have differing effects on constrained and 
unconstrained private firms. The widest differences relate to the influence of growth and size 
and to a limited extent age. On the one hand, we find that growth has a positive and significant 
effect on leverage for unconstrained firms while it is negative and not statistically significant 
for constrained firms. On the other hand, size has a negative and significant relationship for 
constrained firms but a positive and insignificant, near zero influence on unconstrained firms. 
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Though age has a negative influence for both types of firms, for unconstrained firms it is not 
statistically significant. This is consistent with a limited access of constrained private firms to 
borrowing due to their smaller size and younger age when compared with their unconstrained 
counterparts. This may also indicate a limit to growth opportunities constrained firms can take 
advantage of due to limited access to external funds.  
We repeat the analysis for periods of huge investments and find that leverage ratios of 
constrained firms are generally nonresponsive to changes in traditional determinants of 
leverage ratios when faced with huge investments. This contrasts with unconstrained firms who 
show the expected highly significant negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
ratios. We attribute this to a relatively higher level of information asymmetry of constrained 
private firms. Our results also show that, when faced with financing deficits, constrained firms 
make changes to their equity holdings while unconstrained firms make changes to their debt 
holdings. We believe this is attributable to the effects of information asymmetry which limits 
the ability of constrained firms to address financing deficits by changing the mix of their debt 
and equity holdings. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Private UK Firms 2000-2017 
Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME database. Sample period is 2000-2017. Size 
(£ Million) adjusted to constant 2017 Pounds using the CPI from the World Banks World Development Index. Regressions are estimated using 
firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Constrained firms are defined as 
firms in the bottom quartile of inflation adjusted total assets. Unconstrained firms are in the top quartile of inflation adjusted total assets. 1999 
Figures were used in calculating lagged components. 
Variable Period N Mean P50 Std.Dev Skewness Kurt. 
Leverage All  417,389 0.39 0.26 0.48 2.62 13.00 
 Constrained 51,794 0.49 0.00 0.75 1.93 6.50 
 Unconstrained 149,094 0.37 0.29 0.37 2.42 14.70 
Profitability All  417,389 0.09 0.06 0.17 -0.17 7.48 
 Constrained 51,794 0.03 0.00 0.24 0.20 6.08 
 Unconstrained 149,094 0.09 0.08 0.13 -0.14 8.95 
Growth All  417,389 1.10 1.00 0.38 2.56 14.90 
 Constrained 51,794 1.13 1.00 0.48 1.89 8.83 
 Unconstrained 149,094 1.08 1.03 0.32 2.92 19.92 
Tangibility All  417,389 0.25 0.14 0.29 1.08 3.08 
 Constrained 51,794 0.13 0.00 0.30 2.15 6.24 
 Unconstrained 149,094 0.30 0.22 0.28 0.84 2.66 
Size (£ 
Millions) All  417,389 44.21 9.24 131.53 5.79 40.22 
 Constrained 51,794 1.96 1.41 0.96 1.05 3.37 
  Unconstrained 149,094 106.47 30.91 205.15 3.33 14.38 
Age All  417,389 2.90 2.94 0.84 -0.32 2.88 
 Constrained 51,794 2.09 2.19 0.66 -0.34 2.43 
 Unconstrained 149,094 3.55 3.61 0.67 -0.84 4.21 
Financing 
Deficit All 417,389 0.25 0.20 0.42 -0.15 3.07 
  Constrained 51,794 0.23 0.00 0.56 -0.22 2.67 
  Unconstrained 149,094 0.28 0.25 0.38 -0.08 2.79 
Debt Issue All  110,751 0.02 0.00 0.68 3.00 18.98 
 Constrained 6,012 -0.06 0.00 0.50 0.94 10.61 
 Unconstrained 48,612 0.06 0.00 0.76 3.17 17.97 
        
Equity Issue All  107,566 0.03 0.00 0.27 6.11 53.59 
 Constrained 4,559 0.02 0.00 0.22 4.48 50.14 
 Unconstrained 59,414 0.04 0.00 0.28 6.34 53.43 
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Table 3.2 Leverage Regression of private UK firms with Financing Deficit 2000-2017 
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI from the World Banks World 
Development Index. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 1999 Figures were used in calculating lagged components. 
   
  All  Constrained Unconstrained 
Profitability -0.433*** 
(0.008) 
-0.285*** 
(0.018) 
-0.461***    
(0.016) 
Growth 0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.017***    
(0.003) 
Tangibility 0. 147*** 
(0.008) 
0.151*** 
(0.021) 
0.096*** 
(0.013) 
Size -0.038***     
(0.003) 
-0.151*** 
(0.013) 
-0.002     
(0.006) 
Age -0.032*** 
(0.005) 
-0.030 
(0.021) 
-0.073***    
(0.014) 
Financing Deficit 0.054*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
0.058*** 
(0.006) 
Constant 0.512** 
(0.014) 
0.519 
(0.027) 
0.597*** 
(0.050) 
R2 0.0556 0.0405 0.0536 
No. of Observations 417,389 51,794 149,094 
No. Of Firms   48,091 15,251 16,951 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Debt and Equity Financing against Financing Deficit for private UK firms 2000-
2017 
The basic regression equations are Dfit = α + β1FDvit + e for debt financing and Efit = α + β1FDvit + e for equity financing . Where Df is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Leverage – Lagged Leverage) / Lagged Leverage is greater than 5% and zero otherwise. Ef is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Issued Capital – Lagged Issued capital) / Lagged Issued Capital id greater than 5% and zero 
otherwise. Leverage is defined as the sum of short-term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities. FDit = Iit + Dvit 
+ WCit - CFit. I, Investment is the sum of Net Cash In (out) flow return on investment, Net Cash Out (In) flow investing activities, Capital 
expenditure and Financial Investment and Acquisitions and disposals divided by Total Assets.  Dv, Dividends, is Equity dividends paid divided 
by Total Assets.  WC, Working Capital is sum of Work in Progress, Trade Debtors, other current assets minus trade creditors divided by Total 
Assets. CF, Cash Flow is Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Total assets. . Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-
public sector private firms in FAME database. Sample period is 2000-2017. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI 
from the UK office of National Statistics. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Crisis periods are defined as 2007-2009 while non-crisis is 2000 to 2017. 2007 Figures were used 
in calculating lagged components. 
  Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained  
Financing Deficit 
-0.011*** 
 (0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.012**   
(0.006) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.001     
(0.004)  
Constant 
0.223*** 
(0.003) 
0.113** 
(0.007) 
0.271*** 
(0.006) 
0.191*** 
(0.002) 
0.039*** 
(0.005) 
0.325*** 
(0.004)  
R2 0.0026 0.0050 0.0031 0.0144 0.0154 0.0111  
No. of Observations 417,389 51,794 149,094 417,389 51,794 149,094  
No. Of Firms 48,091 15,251 16,951 48,091 15,251 16,951  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 3.4 Leverage Regression of private UK firms with Financing Deficit 2000-2017 
Spike versus Off Spike Periods  
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2017 Pounds using the CPI from the World Banks World 
Development Index. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 1999 Figures were used in calculating lagged components. 
  
 Spike   Off-Spike   
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained 
Profitability -0.438*** 
(0.049) 
-0.557  
(0.605) 
-0.354***    
(0.057) 
-0.452***     
(0.026) 
-0.209    
(0.190) 
-0.455***    
(0.033) 
Growth 
0.020**  
(0.009) 
0.179  
(0.121) 
0.014      
(0.010) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.045  
(0.036) 
0.016***    
(0.004) 
Tangibility 
0.085* 
 (0.048) 
-0.946* 
(0.501) 
0.084 
(0.062) 
0.060*** 
(0.021) 
-0.055    
(0.091) 
0.073*** 
(0.025) 
Size 
-0.023     
(0.018) 
-0.474  
(0.338) 
0.027      
(0.020) 
-0.018**     
(0.009) 
-0.203*  
(0.117) 
0.007      
(0.010) 
Age 
0.011  
(0.022) 
-1.093 
(0.828) 
0.073      
(0.077) 
-0.018    
(0.013) 
0.020 
 (0.157) 
-0.021    
(0.021) 
Financing Deficit 
0.072*** 
(0.022) 
-0.600  
(0.372) 
0.045*    
(0.027) 
0.058*** 
(0.009) 
0.058      
(0.049) 
0.050*** 
(0.011) 
Constant 
0.490*** 
(0.128) 
4.219*** 
(0.935) 
0.068      
(0.230) 
0.553*** 
(0.044) 
0.583***  
(0.198) 
0.443*** 
(0.080) 
R2 0.0516 0.3384 0.0342 0.0509 0.0909 0.0490 
No. of Observations 9,533 178 6,910 45,818 817 31,083 
No. Of Firms  2,499 104 1,760   4,973 371 3,327 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 3.5 Debt and Equity Financing against Financing Deficit for private UK Huge 
Investments  
The basic regression equations are Dfit = α + β1FDvit + e for debt financing and Efit = α + β1FDvit + e for equity financing . Where Df is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Leverage – Lagged Leverage) / Lagged Leverage is greater than 5% and zero otherwise. Ef is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Issued Capital – Lagged Issued capital) / Lagged Issued Capital id greater than 5% and zero 
otherwise. Leverage is defined as the sum of short-term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities. FDit = Iit + Dvit 
+ WCit - CFit. I, Investment is the sum of Net Cash In (out) flow return on investment, Net Cash Out (In) flow investing activities, Capital 
expenditure and Financial Investment and Acquisitions and disposals divided by Total Assets.  Dv, Dividends, is Equity dividends paid divided 
by Total Assets.  WC, Working Capital is sum of Work in Progress, Trade Debtors, other current assets minus trade creditors divided by Total 
Assets. CF, Cash Flow is Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Total assets. . Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-
public sector private firms in FAME database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI 
from the UK office of National Statistics. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. We defined huge investments as any Investment more than twice the historical median investment 
for each firm. 
  Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained 
Financing 
Deficit 
-0.093*** 
(0.027) 
-0.055 
(0.150) 
-0.078**    
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.022) 
-0.001   
(0.008) 
0.004       
 (0.028) 
Constant 0.280*** 
(0.035) 
0.572*** 
(0.218) 
0.259*** 
(0.041) 
0.371*** 
(0.022) 
0.193*** 
(0.003) 
0.432***  
(0.026) 
R2 0.0060 0.3287 0.0054 0.0124 0.0048 0.0120 
No. of 
Observations 
9,533 178 6,910 9,533 10,780 6,910 
No. Of Firms 2,499 104 1,760 2,499 6,979 1,760 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered 
by Firm 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 Debt and Equity Financing against Financing Deficit for private UK Regular 
Investments  
The basic regression equations are Dfit = α + β1FDvit + e for debt financing and Efit = α + β1FDvit + e for equity financing . Where Df is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Leverage – Lagged Leverage) / Lagged Leverage is greater than 5% and zero otherwise. Ef is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Issued Capital – Lagged Issued capital) / Lagged Issued Capital id greater than 5% and zero 
otherwise. Leverage is defined as the sum of short-term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities. FDit = Iit + Dvit 
+ WCit - CFit. I, Investment is the sum of Net Cash In (out) flow return on investment, Net Cash Out (In) flow investing activities, Capital 
expenditure and Financial Investment and Acquisitions and disposals divided by Total Assets.  Dv, Dividends, is Equity dividends paid divided 
by Total Assets.  WC, Working Capital is sum of Work in Progress, Trade Debtors, other current assets minus trade creditors divided by Total 
Assets. CF, Cash Flow is Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Total assets. . Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-
public sector private firms in FAME database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI 
from the UK office of National Statistics. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. We defined huge investments as any Investment more than twice the historical median investment 
for each firm. 
  Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained 
Financing 
Deficit 
0.000     
(0.009) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
-0.021    
(0.014) 
0.013** 
(0.007) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
0.011       
(0.009) 
Constant 0.294*** 
(0.010) 
0.255*** 
(0.069) 
0.297*** 
(0.013) 
0.394*** 
(0.007) 
0.048*** 
(0.049) 
0.482*** 
(0.009) 
R2 0.0053 0.0245 0.0047 0.0162 0.0638 0.0129 
No. of 
Observations 
45,818 817 31,083 45,818 817 31,083 
No. Of Firms 4,973 371 3,327 4,973 371 3,327 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered 
by Firm 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 Leverage Regression of private UK firms with Financing Deficit: Crisis versus 
Non- Crisis periods 2000-2017  
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2017 Pounds using the CPI from the UK office of National 
Statistics. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Crisis periods are defined as 2007-2009 while non-crisis is 2000-2006 and 2010 to 2017.  
   
 Financial Crisis Non -Financial Crisis 
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained  
Profitability -0.265*** 
(0.017) 
-0.161*** 
(0.046) 
-0.304***    
(0.030) 
-0.443*** 
(0.009) 
-0.289*** 
(0.021) 
-0.470***    
(0.018) 
 
Growth 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.003     
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.018***    
(0.003) 
 
Tangibility 0.106*** 
(0.020) 
0.040 
(0.046) 
0.065** 
(0.031) 
0.147*** 
(0.009) 
0.145*** 
(0.023) 
0.095*** 
(0.014) 
 
Size -0.028***     
(0.008) 
-0.196*** 
(0.031) 
0.043***   
(0.013) 
-0.036***     
(0.003) 
-0.148*** 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
 
Age 0.348* 
(0.020) 
0.067 
(0.069) 
0.007     
(0.040) 
-0.034*** 
(0.006) 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
-0.072***    
(0.015) 
 
Financing Deficit 0.046*** 
(0.007) 
0.039*** 
(0.015) 
0.052*** 
(0.011) 
0.057*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.059*** 
(0.006) 
 
Constant 0.358*** 
(0.057) 
0.045*** 
(0.132) 
0.188     
(0.148) 
0.510*** 
(0.015) 
0.519*** 
(0.030) 
0.595*** 
(0.053) 
 
R2 0.0338 0.0322 0.0458 0.0562 0.0411 0.0533  
No. of Observations 63,596 8,858 22,878 353,793 42,936 126,216  
No. Of Firms 25,278 4,783 8,880 47,588 14,431 16,830  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 3.8 Debt and Equity Financing against Financing Deficit for private UK firms 
during Crisis Periods  
The basic regression equations are Dfit = α + β1FDvit + e for debt financing and Efit = α + β1FDvit + e for equity financing . Where Df is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Leverage – Lagged Leverage) / Lagged Leverage is greater than 5% and zero otherwise. Ef is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Issued Capital – Lagged Issued capital) / Lagged Issued Capital id greater than 5% and zero 
otherwise. Leverage is defined as the sum of short-term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities. FDit = Iit + Dvit 
+ WCit - CFit. I, Investment is the sum of Net Cash In (out) flow return on investment, Net Cash Out (In) flow investing activities, Capital 
expenditure and Financial Investment and Acquisitions and disposals divided by Total Assets.  Dv, Dividends, is Equity dividends paid divided 
by Total Assets.  WC, Working Capital is sum of Work in Progress, Trade Debtors, other current assets minus trade creditors divided by Total 
Assets. CF, Cash Flow is Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Total assets. . Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-
public sector private firms in FAME database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI 
from the UK office of National Statistics. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Crisis periods are defined as 2007-2009 while non-crisis periods are 2000-2006 and 2010 to 2017. 
  Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained  
Financing Deficit -0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
-0.028**    
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.005) 
0.007     
(0.007) 
 
Constant 0.210*** 
(0.002) 
0.113*** 
(0.004) 
0.250*** 
(0.005) 
0.259*** 
(0.001) 
0.077*** 
(0.002) 
0.398*** 
(0.002) 
 
R2 0.0015 0.0019 0.0027 0.0028 0.0071 0.0032  
No. of Observations 63,596 8,858 22,878 63,596 8,858 22,878  
No. Of Firms 25,278 4,783 8,880 25,278 4,783 8,880  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 3.9 Debt and Equity Financing against Financing Deficit for private UK firms 
during Non-Crisis Periods 
The basic regression equations are Dfit = α + β1FDvit + e for debt financing and Efit = α + β1FDvit + e for equity financing . Where Df is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Leverage – Lagged Leverage) / Lagged Leverage is greater than 5% and zero otherwise. Ef is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if (Issued Capital – Lagged Issued capital) / Lagged Issued Capital id greater than 5% and zero 
otherwise. Leverage is defined as the sum of short-term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities. FDit = Iit + Dvit 
+ WCit - CFit. I, Investment is the sum of Net Cash In (out) flow return on investment, Net Cash Out (In) flow investing activities, Capital 
expenditure and Financial Investment and Acquisitions and disposals divided by Total Assets.  Dv, Dividends, is Equity dividends paid divided 
by Total Assets.  WC, Working Capital is sum of Work in Progress, Trade Debtors, other current assets minus trade creditors divided by Total 
Assets. CF, Cash Flow is Cash and Cash Equivalents divided by Total assets. . Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-
public sector private firms in FAME database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI 
from the UK office of National Statistics. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Crisis periods are defined as 2007-2009 while non-crisis periods are 2000-2006 and 2010 to 2017. 
  Debt Financing Equity Financing 
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained  
Financing Deficit -0.010*** 
(0. 002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.010    
(0.006) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001     
(0.004) 
 
Constant 0.224*** 
(0.003) 
0.111*** 
(0.007) 
0.272*** 
(0.006) 
0.186*** 
(0.002) 
0.039*** 
(0.005) 
0.319*** 
(0.004) 
 
R2 0.0030 0.0059 0.0035 0.0156 0.0161 0.0118  
No. of Observations 353,793 42,936 126,216 353,793 42,936 126,216  
No. Of Firms 47,588 14,431 16,830 47,588 14,431 16,830  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Figure 3.1 Financing Deficit, Debt and Equity Financing of Constrained and Unconstrained Private UK Firms 2000-2017 
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Figure 3.2 Trends in Investment Spikes for Constrained and Unconstrained Private UK Firms 2000-2017 
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Table 3.10 Description of Variables 
Variable Proxy FAME Variables 
Leverage 
(Short Term Loans & Overdrafts + 
Other Short-Term Loans + Long Term 
Liabilities) / Total Assets 
Short Term Loans & Overdrafts 
(LOAN), Other Short-Term Loans 
(OSTL), Long Term Liabilities 
(NCLI), Total Assets (TOTA) 
Profitability EBITDA / ((Total Assets + lagged 
Total Assets)/2) 
EBITDA (EBTA), Total Assets 
(TOTA) 
Growth 
Turnover / lagged Turnover 
Turnover (Profit & Loss account) 
(TURN) 
Tangibility 
(Tangible Assets + Investments) / Total 
Assets 
Tangible Assets (TASS), Investments 
(Fixed Assets) (INVT), Investments 
(Current Assets) (IOCA), Total Assets 
(TOTA) 
Size 
Natural log of Total Assets Total Assets (TOTA) 
Age Natural log of Number of Years since 
incorporation Date of incorporation (INCORDATE) 
Debt Issue Dummy variable = 1 if (Leverage – 
Lagged Leverage) / Lagged Leverage is 
greater than 5%, 0 otherwise. As in Leverage above 
Equity Issue Dummy variable = 1 if (Issued Capital 
– Lagged Issued capital) / Lagged 
Issued Capital is greater than 5%, 0 
otherwise Issued Capital (CAPI) 
Investment 
(Net Cash In (Out) flow Ret. On Invest. 
+ Net Cash Out (In) flow Investing 
Activ. + Capital Expenditure & Financ. 
Invest. + Acquisition & Disposal) / 
Total Assets 
Net Cash In (Out) flow Ret. On Invest. 
(CF02), Net Cash Out (In) flow 
Investing Activ (CF04), Capital 
Expenditure & Financ. Invest. (CF07), 
Acquisition & Disposal (CF08), Total 
Assets (TOTA)  
Dividend 
Equity Dividends Paid / Total Assets 
Equity Dividends Paid (CF09), Total 
Assets (TOTA) 
Working 
Capital (W.I.P. + Trade Debtors + Other 
Current Assets - Trade Creditors) / 
Total Assets 
W.I.P. (WIPE), Trade Debtors 
(DEBT), Other Current Assets 
(OCAS), Trade Creditors (CRED), 
Total Assets (TOTA) 
Cash Flow Increase (Decrease) Cash & Equiv. / 
Total Assets 
Increase (Decrease) Cash & Equiv. 
(CF06), Total Assets (TOTA) 
Financing 
Deficit Investment + Dividend + Working 
Capital – Cash Flow Please see above 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
APPENDIX 3.B 
Table 3.11.B1 Pair-wise correlation matrix  
  D P G T S A Df Ef I Dv WC CF FD 
D 1.00             
P -0.31 
(0.00) 
1.00            
G 0.02 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
1.00           
T 0.14 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
1.00          
S 0.05 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.21 
(0.00) 
1.00         
A -0.16 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
1.00        
Df 0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
0.10 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
1.00       
Ef 0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
1.00      
I 0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
0.33 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.00) 
1.00     
Dv -0.06 
(0.00) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.15 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.36) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.89) 
1.00    
WC 0.06 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.41 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.41) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
0.15 
(0.00) 
1.00   
CF -0.14 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
-0.16 
(0.00) 
1.00  
FD 0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
0.82 
(0.00) 
-0.59 
(0.00) 
1.00 
P values in parenthesis 
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Table 3.12.B2 Leverage Regression of private UK firms 2000-2017 
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI from the World Banks World 
Development Index. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 1999 Figures were used in calculating lagged components. 
   
  All  Constrained Unconstrained 
Profitability -0.438*** 
(0. 008) 
-0.284*** 
(0.018) 
-0.471***    
(0.016) 
Growth 0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.015***    
(0.003) 
Tangibility 0. 145*** 
(0.008) 
0.151*** 
(0.021) 
0.093*** 
(0.013) 
Size -0.036***     
(0.003) 
-0.152*** 
(0.013) 
0.000     
(0.006) 
Age -0.029*** 
(0.005) 
-0.028 
(0.021) 
-0.066***    
(0.014) 
Constant 0.516** 
(0.014) 
0.522 
(0.027) 
0.583*** 
(0.050) 
R2 0.0529 0.0390 0.0503 
No. of Observations 417,389 51,794 149,094 
No. Of Firms   48,091 15,251 16,951 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 3.13.B3 Leverage Regression of private UK firms 2000-2017 Spike versus Off Spike 
Periods 
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2017 Pounds using the CPI from the World Banks World 
Development Index. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 1999 Figures were used in calculating lagged components. 
   
 Spike   Off-Spike   
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained 
Profitability -0.442*** 
(0.049) 
-0.418  
(0.574) 
-0.354***    
(0.057) 
-0.462***     
(0.026) 
-0.203    
(0.190) 
-0.466***    
(0.033) 
Growth 
0.019**  
(0.009) 
0.120  
(0.115) 
0.013      
(0.010) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.047  
(0.036) 
0.015***    
(0.004) 
Tangibility 
0.100**  
(0.048) 
-0.741  
(0.542) 
0.091 
(0.064) 
0.069*** 
(0.021) 
-0.027    
(0.088) 
0.073*** 
(0.025) 
Size 
-0.023     
(0.018) 
-0.354  
(0.378) 
0.028      
(0.020) 
-0.017**     
(0.009) 
-0.204*  
(0.017) 
0.009      
(0.010) 
Age 
0.014  
(0.047) 
-0.934  
(0.839) 
0.076      
(0.077) 
-0.013    
(0.013) 
0.033 
 (0.156) 
-0.015    
(0.021) 
Constant 
0.511*** 
(0.128) 
3.477*** 
(0.955) 
0.068      
(0.230) 
0.551*** 
(0.044) 
0.571***  
(0.197) 
0.438*** 
(0.080) 
R2 0.0485 0.3141 0.0342 0.0478 0.0870 0.0466 
No. of Observations 9,533 178 6,910 45,818 817 31,083 
No. Of Firms  2,499 104 1,760   4,973 371 3,327 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 3.14.B4 Leverage Regression of private UK firms: Crisis versus Non- Crisis 
periods 2000-2017 
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2017 Pounds using the CPI from the UK office of National 
Statistics. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Crisis periods are defined as 2007-2009 while non-crisis is 2000-2006 and 2010 to 2017.  
    
 Financial Crisis Non -Financial Crisis 
  All  Constrained Unconstrained All  Constrained Unconstrained  
Profitability -0.266*** 
(0. 017) 
-0.159*** 
(0.046) 
-0.307***    
(0.030) 
-0.448*** 
(0. 009) 
-0.288*** 
(0.021) 
-0.480***    
(0.018) 
 
Growth 0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.002     
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.017***    
(0.003) 
 
Tangibility 0.108*** 
(0.020) 
0.043 
(0.046) 
0.065** 
(0.031) 
0.144*** 
(0.009) 
0.145*** 
(0.023) 
0.092*** 
(0.014) 
 
Size -0.028***     
(0.008) 
-0.197*** 
(0.031) 
0.044***   
(0.013) 
-0.035***     
(0.003) 
-0.149*** 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
 
Age 0.362* 
(0.020) 
0.066 
(0.069) 
0.010     
(0.040) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
-0.065***    
(0.015) 
 
Constant 0.366** 
(0.057) 
0.045*** 
(0.132) 
0.186*** 
(0.148) 
0.514*** 
(0.015) 
0.522*** 
(0.030) 
0.580*** 
(0.053) 
 
R2 0.0311 0.0301 0.0422 0.0532 0.0395 0.0499  
No. of Observations 63,596 8,858 22,878 353,793 42,936 126,216  
No. Of Firms 25,278 4,783 8,880 47,588 14,431 16,830  
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 3.15.B5 Diagnostic Test – Hausman Test 
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI from the World Banks World 
Development Index. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 1999 Figures were used in calculating lagged components. 
 (b) (B) (b-B)  sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 fixed random Difference S.E   
Profitability -0.43369 -0.49421 0.060525 0.000822   
Growth 0.013545 0.013864 -0.00032 0.000188   
Tangibility 0.147175 0.181566 -0.03439 0.001651   
Size -0.0377 -0.01517 -0.02253 0.000616   
Age -0.03189 -0.07477 0.042873 0.001879   
Financing 
Deficit 0.05426 0.066852 -0.01259 0.00049   
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg  
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
       
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic   
       
                 chi2(23) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                             = 8297.99 
   
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000     
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)    
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Table 3.16.B6 Diagnostic Test – Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI from the World Banks World 
Development Index. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 1999 Figures were used in calculating lagged components. 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,   39061) =   5379.262  
           Prob > F =      0.0000       
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Table 3.17.B7 Diagnostic Test – Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in 
fixed effect regression model 
The basic regression equations is Dit = α + β1Pit + β2Git + β3Tit + β4Sit + β5Ait + e. D, Leverage ratio, is defined as the ratio of the sum of short-
term loans and overdrafts, other short-term loans and long-term liabilities to total assets. P, Return on Assets, is ratio of EBITDA to the sum 
of Total assets and lagged total assets divided by 2. Growth, G, is the ratio of Turnover to lagged Turnover. Tangibility, T, is the ratio of the 
sum of tangible assets and Investments to Total assets. Size, S, is the natural logarithm of Total Assets. Age, A, is the Natural logarithm of 
number of years since date of incorporation. Computations are based on nonfinancial, non-utility and non-public sector private firms in FAME 
database. Sample period is 2008-2016. Size (£ Million) deflated to constant 2016 Pounds using the CPI from the World Banks World 
Development Index. Regressions are estimated using firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 1999 Figures were used in calculating lagged components. 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
    
chi2 (48091)  = 3.7e+39  
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000  
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Chapter 4 Excess Cash Holdings and Corporate Firms in 
major European Economies 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The issue of firms holding seemingly more cash than is thought to be required has been a 
subject of interest to many scholars. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) carrying out a cross country 
analysis of trends in cash holdings, found that there is a near systemic uptrend in cash holdings. 
J.P. Morgan Corporate Finance Advisory, (2015) also suggested that high cash balances are 
mainly attributable to large profitable firms, the slow economic growth, the recent financial 
crisis and tax considerations and concluded that more efforts should be geared towards 
effective management of excess cash. On the other hand, Azar, Kagy and Schmalz, (2016) 
argue that, when costs of holding cash are adjusted for, the cash holdings of firms in their 
sample are not unusually larger than previously concluding that cost of holding cash was a 
major determinant of level of liquid assets that firms hold.  
In the light of the above conflicting results, the paper will attempt an empirical analysis of the 
cash holding patterns of EU firms. We test empirically some aspects of the theoretical analysis 
by Harris and Raviv (2017) and further extend the analysis to examine scenarios where a 
combination of high levels of excess cash and high debt levels occur simultaneously as per 
Huang, Instefjord and Shen (2016). We will also examine different quartiles of excess cash 
holdings and compare the major determinants of excess cash across quartiles of excess cash 
and turnover growth.  
Harris and Raviv (2017) suggested that huge cash holdings are more associated with firms in 
the middle brackets of growth opportunities as firms in the top and bottom brackets will 
normally not keep excess cash. We carry out an empirical analysis of their theoretical model 
by regressing excess cash holdings against relevant proxies for information asymmetry, 
growth, asset value, costs of holding cash, current levels of investment and other control 
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variables. Our analysis is carried out in a number of groupings. We first combine all EU firms 
together and then analyse the five largest EU economies separately. We then consider all EU 
high technology firms in a separate analysis. This is due to a greater likelihood that they hold 
more cash than firms in other industries. 
Our findings indicate that uniform determinates of excess cash holdings across all groupings 
are Size and earnings (negative). Other determinants, which are economically less so, are 
Research and Development Expense – our proxy for information asymmetry (positive), Market 
to Book Ratio – our proxy for growth opportunities and Cost of Carry (negative). The fact that 
results for cost of carry and debt vary across groupings points to the influence of the existing 
interest rate regimes in particular countries on the excess cash holdings of firms in those 
countries. 
We also analyse all firms in various quartiles of excess cash and find that, across all quartiles, 
size and debt are a negative and significant determinant of excess cash. This is similar to results 
for all firms considered together. Cost of carry is uniformly negative and significant except for 
the first quartile which is not statistically significant. Market to book ratio is uniformly negative 
but only significant at the second and third quartile of excess cash holdings. Research and 
development expense is only positive and significant at the top quartile of excess cash 
suggesting the influence of group of firms with the highest levels of excess cash when all firms 
are considered together. It will thus appear that, apart from size, the key determinants of excess 
cash depend on the quartile of excess cash holdings a firm falls in any given year. 
When terciles of turnover growth are considered, it appears that, size and earnings (negative) 
and research and development (positive) are fairly consistent across terciles of turnover growth 
as key determinants of excess cash. However, the significance of other variables considered 
depends on the tercile of turnover growth a firm falls in any given year. We show that the 
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middle tercile has the greatest number of significant variables and greatest explanatory power. 
This is consistent with Harris and Raviv (2017) who alluded to this when they showed that 
only firms in the middle range of opportunities will hold excess cash. 
Finally, when different combinations of relative high debt and high excess cash are considered, 
it appears that High Debt-High Excess cash firms are quite different from High Debt-Low 
Excess cash firms. While Research and development expense is a positive determinant of 
excess cash for High debt low excess cash firms it is negative and not a significant determinant 
for high debt low excess cash firms. CAPEX is a highly significant determinant of excess cash 
for high debt high excess cash firms, statistically and economically. This is however not the 
case for High debt low excess cash firms. This suggests that High Debt High excess cash firms 
invest heavily in research and development and CAPEX which accounts for the unusual 
combination of a simultaneous high level of debt and excess cash. 
The rest of the paper will start with an examination of related studies. This will be followed by 
a brief outline of methodological approach of the paper. Subsequently, we will carry out an 
analysis of empirical estimates followed by an interim conclusion to the paper. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
A number of studies have related cash holdings and or excess cash holdings to a number of 
factors with mixed results. Identified factors include Financing Constraints and Hedging 
(Acharya, Almeida & Campello, 2007); Business cycles and volume of long-term debt 
(Anderson and Carverhill, 2012); Cost of carry (Azar, Kagy and Schmalz, 2016); Level of 
variation in cash flows (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009) and Financing Frictions (Decamps et al 
(2011).  
Bigelli and Sanchez-Vidal (2012) examined cash holding in Italian private firms based on the 
AIDA database.  According to them, cash holdings is related with smaller size, higher risk and 
lower effective tax rate (TOT), longer cash conversion cycles and lower financing deficits 
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(POT). Furthermore, they held that more dividends resulted in more cash holdings and that 
Bank debt and net working capital are good substitutes for cash. Cash rich firms are more 
profitable, pay more dividends and have medium term investment horizon. Our analysis will 
go beyond examining determinants of cash to key drivers of determinants of excess cash across 
different groupings of firms. 
Chen and Chuang (2009) examined the link between corporate governance and cash holdings 
with a special focus on growing firms. Their sample was High tech firms on the NASDAQ 
exchange. According to them CEO ownership, directorship of venture capitalists and 
independent directors play crucial roles in cash policy. They found that effect of corporate 
governance on cash holdings was more significant in younger firms while effect of firm 
specific economic variables in older firms. Like Chen and Chuang (2009), we include a number 
of firm specific variables while at the same time extending the analysis to cover all non-
financial, non-utility firms in our selected database. 
Davidson (2016), writing in a New York Times Article argued that the possible reasons for 
firms holding huge cash including, precautionary motives, tax benefits and funding 
acquisitions do not adequately explain current levels of cash holdings. He therefore examined 
other reasons including Agency problems which could be restricted by market discipline. This, 
according to him, is however industry specific. We carry out our analysis clustering by industry 
to partly address industry specific characteristics in our sample. 
Harris and Raviv (2017), examined various motives for holding cash in prior literature and 
concluded that the agency theory was inaccurate in explaining cash holdings. They held that 
the precautionary motive was a better rationale and that asymmetric information was the key 
driver of this motive. In their theory paper, they argued that Excess cash is held mainly by firms 
in the middle range of growth opportunities and not so much by firms on either extreme. 
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Furthermore, Excess cash is a function of level of information asymmetry, growth 
opportunities, assets value, and cost of holding cash. Our paper will attempt an empirical 
analysis by carrying out a regression of excess cash against the identified key variables based 
on our selected sample. Furthermore, we will carry out our analysis by comparing results across 
terciles of turnover growth in order to see if the middle group dominates. 
Huang-Meier, Lambertides and Steeley (2016) examined effects of CEO optimism on cash 
holdings. According to them optimistic managers are reluctant to hold external funds. 
Furthermore, they found no evidence of a connection between optimistic managers' cash 
hoarding and debt conservatism. Thus, the concluded that Optimistic managers hold relatively 
more cash in periods of economic downturn. 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012), in carrying out a cross country analysis of trends in cash 
holdings, found that there is a near systemic uptrend in cash holdings. According to them, 
different factors are responsible for this uptrend. In countries like Canada, France, UK and US 
time varying firm characteristics were the driving force while. Agency problems accounted for 
that of Germany, while Shallow private credit markets explained Australia. We will therefore 
be including a number of time varying firm characteristics in carrying out our analysis. 
Opler et al (1999) in examining determinants of corporate cash holdings found evidence 
supportive of a static trade-off model of cash holdings. According to them, High Cash to total 
non-cash assets led to strong growth opportunities and riskier Cash Flows. They also found 
that increased profitability led to a more than proportionate level of cash holdings. They found 
limited evidence of impact on capex, acquisitions and pay-outs and concluded that changes in 
cash mainly caused by losses. We will adopt that method of calculating excess cash in our 
analysis the same method used by Huang and Mazouz (2018). 
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Ferreira and Vilela (2004) attempted an analysis of firms’ cash holding choices. According to 
them Cash Holding was positively related to Investment opportunities and Cash flows and 
negatively related to asset liquidity, leverage, size, Bank debt, investor protection and capital 
market development. We extend the analyses by examining the determinants of excess cash 
holdings across different for all firms and across different combinations of high debt and excess 
cash. 
4.2.1 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
We examine a couple of implications following from the literature. The first one is based on 
the theoretical study of Harris and Raviv (2017). 
Implication 1: Firms in the middle tier of investment opportunities will have more excess 
cash holdings than their other counterparts 
Harris and Raviv (2017) argued that firms in the lower rung of investment opportunities will 
hold relatively less excess cash when compared to their counterparts in the middle tier of excess 
cash holdings. According to them, one of the major reasons to hold excess cash is to take 
advantage of impending investment opportunities. Similarly, firms in the upper levels of 
investment opportunities will also hold relatively less excess cash compared to their middle 
tier counterparts as cash will be immediately expended to execute the high levels of investment 
opportunities as they arise. Thus, we will expect that in a regression of excess cash against a 
number of variables, as detailed in our methodology section, middle tier firms will dominate 
the others in terms of the significance and/or magnitude of these variables as determinants of 
excess cash holdings. 
Implication 2: Firms with a simultaneous combination of high debt and high excess cash 
will differ from other firms with high debt and low excess cash in terms of major factors 
affecting excess cash holdings. 
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The existence of firms that simultaneously hold high levels of debt and excess cash is somewhat 
puzzling as one should expect that, given the relative costs of holding debts and excess cash, 
this should normally not occur (Huang, Instefjord and Shen 2016). We will therefore expect 
that such firms will differ in some respects to firms who do the more logical alternative of 
holding high debt and low excess cash. Thus we will expect that in a regression of excess cash 
against a number of variables, as detailed in our methodology section, firms who 
simultaneously hold high levels of debt and excess cash will differ from firms who hold high 
debt and low excess cash in terms of the significance and/or magnitude of these variables as 
determinants of excess cash holdings. 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
Our data is sourced from all publicly listed non-financial and non-utility firms in the Compustat 
database from 2002 to 2016. This period was chosen to enable us observe dynamics across 
different interest rate regimes.  To calculate cost of carry we source 3-month short term interest 
rates from the UK Data Service International aggregate data while stock prices are sourced 
from Compustat Securities Daily. We exclude all Financial (SIC 6000-6999) and Utility (4900-
4999) firms based on the peculiar nature of their financing mix (Opler et all, 1999). Variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to take care of outliers. 
We begin the analysis by running a regression of Cash against determinants identified in 
literature as follows; 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
Where, CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term 
Investments to Net Assets. E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related 
expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. D, Debt = (Long Term Debt + Debt in 
Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets – Total Common 
and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. S, Size 
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is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. W, Net Working Capital = (Working Capital – 
Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. Dv, Dividend, is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
We then designate the residual of this regression as excess cash and run a regression as follows; 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 +
𝛽𝛽8𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         (2) 
Where, CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Short Term Interest 
Rates) / Net Assets. (Azar, Kagy and Schmalz, 2016). Other Variables are lags of variables 
defined in Equation 1 above. Table 4.9.C1 provides a more detailed description of variables. 
We repeat the analysis for firms in various terciles of turnover growth, quartiles of Excess Cash 
Holdings and across various combinations of High Debt and High Excess cash and compare 
results. High Tech Firms are classified using optimal SIC code classifications by Kile and 
Phillips (2009). 
4.4 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
An analysis of Descriptive statistics and results of regression estimates will be carried out in 
this section. Table 4.1 show descriptive statistics related to cash holdings of publicly listed EU 
firms while Figure 4.1 shows the level of excess cash holdings of firms across different 
countries of the EU. 
Table 4.1, shows that the ratio of Cash to Net Assets is on average 0.41. This varies across 
major European economies from 0.13 in Spain to 0.58 in the UK. On average, High Technology 
Firms have a higher ratio of 0.69. The average earnings ratio is -0.06 of net assets probably due 
to the negative skewness of earnings. Median earnings are however a positive 7% of net assets. 
Excess cash is 0.24 on the Average ranging from 0.14 for Italy to a much higher 0.38 for UK 
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firms with High Technology firms having a 0.41 average. Figure 4.1 shows trends in Excess 
cash holdings across the different groupings. Earnings ratio varies across the major economies 
from -0.17 in UK to 0.05 in Spain. High Tech Firms on the Average have -0.19 earnings ratio. 
Debt to Net Assets ratio is on the Average 0.22 ranging from 0.19 in the UK to 0.34 in Spain 
with High Technology firms averaging 0.18. It will thus appear that, amongst the major 
economies, countries with the lowest level of debt also have the highest level of cash on the 
average. Working Capital ranges from -0.03 in Spain to 0.07 in Germany with an average of 
0.02 for all EU countries included in the sample. The figure for High Technology companies 
is on the average -0.02. CAPEX is fairly similar across the major economies and is on the 
average 0.05 of Net Assets. The ratio of Research and Development Expenses to Net Assets is 
on the average 0.44 ranging from 0.04 in Italy to 1.09 in France. High Technology Companies 
have a ratio double that of the average at 0.88. The Cost of holding Cash is on the average 0.72 
within the sample. However, this is largely due to the high cost of 1.56 of the UK compared to 
0.06 of Spain and 1.18 for High Technology firms across the region. The High Average cost 
for the UK is directly related to the relatively higher levels of cash holding. Market to Book 
Ratio is an average of 1.92 ranking from 1.40 in Italy to 2.32 in the UK with All High 
Technology Firms being 2.40. It is thus not surprising that UK firms in our sample appear to 
hold more cash to take advantage of their higher levels of investment opportunities during the 
period.  Net assets of firms are $2,910.27 on the average. While it is $1,525.28 for UK firms 
the amount is $5,571.27 for Italian Firms. We will attempt to examine the effects of high 
leverage on the determinants of excess cash by running a separate regression of firms in the 
top quartile of debt to net asset ratios. We will proceed by carrying out a preliminary analysis 
of regression estimates. 
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4.4.2 Analysis of Regression Estimates. 
As per Opler et al (1999) and Huang and Mazouz (2018) we begin the analysis by running a 
regression of cash again a number of independent variables as per equation 1 and the results 
are presented in Table 4.2. Based on our sample, it can be observed that the key determinants 
of cash are earnings, debt, Size, Working Capital, Capex and Research and Developments 
Expenses. While Earnings, Debt, Size and Working Capital are negative and significant 
determinants of cash. CAPEX and Research and development expense is a positive and 
significant determinant. This is exactly mirrored by EU High Tech Firms and UK firms 
included in the sample. However, for UK firms Market to Book ratio is also slightly significant. 
The strongest uniform determinant across the major EU countries is Size. Working Capital is 
uniformly negative and significant except for Spain and Italy. Our key interest is in analysing 
excess cash and therefore we proceed with the analysis by obtaining the residual of the above 
regressions and running a separate regression against determinants of excess cash as per 
equation 2. Results are presented from Table 4.3 onwards. 
4.4.2.1 Excess Cash Holdings 
We run a series of estimates, first with lags of key variables identified by Harris and Raviv 
(2017) as in our earlier equation to minimize endogeneity issues as doing otherwise will mean 
the same set of variables are used in both regression estimates. In Table 4.3, Column 1 details 
regression estimates for all countries combined. It can be observed that while Research and 
development expense and Cost of carry are positive and significant determinant of Excess cash, 
Size, Earnings and Debt are negative determinants. We carry out separate regressions for the 
five major European Economies as well as for all European High Technology firms combined. 
A uniform result across all groupings is Size which is negative and significant across the board. 
Earnings are generally negative and significant except for Italy and Spain where it is not 
statistically significant. While Research and development is uniformly positive across all 
groups, it is not statistically significant for France, Spain and High-Tech Companies. Results 
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for the other variables are mixed. The closest approximation to the combined results presented 
in Column 1 are for the UK and High Technology firms. These are also the two groups with 
relatively higher cash and excess cash holdings which probably explains the difference with 
other groups in our study. We proceed with the analysis by carrying out the same regression 
on various quartiles of Excess cash and comparing determinants across quartiles as presented 
in Table 4.4. We present results for all countries combined together. 
A common determinant across all quartiles is Size which is a negative and significant 
determinant of Excess cash across all four quartiles of excess cash as well as for all firms 
considered together. Research and development Expense is positive and significant at the 4th 
quartile and for all firms combined. Market to Book ratio is negative across all quartiles but 
only significant at the 2nd and 3rd quartiles of excess cash when all firms are considered 
together. Economic significance at all levels is however small. Cost of Carry is positive and 
significant at the 4th quartile of excess cash and when all firms are considered together. It is 
however, slightly negative at the 2nd and 3rd Quartiles. Earnings is negative and significant only 
at the 4th quartiles and for all firms combined. It is however positive at the 2nd quartile. Except 
for the 4th quartile, working capital is uniformly negative but is only significant at the 2nd 
quartile of excess cash.  
Thus, apart from size and debt, which are uniformly negative and significant across all quartiles 
of excess cash, the results indicate varying influences of the key determinants across quartiles. 
For the first quartile key determinants are size and debt which are both negative and significant. 
While Market to Book Ratio, Size, Cost of Carry, Debt and Working Capital are negative 
determinants of excess cash in the 2nd quartile, Earnings is positive. For the 3rd quartile, key 
determinants are Market to Book Ratio, Size, Cost of carry and Debt which are all negative 
and significant determinants of excess cash. Finally, the 4th quartile has research and 
development expense and cost of carry as positive determinants while size, earnings and debt 
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are negative determinant. It will thus appear that, apart from size, the key determinants of 
excess cash depend on the quartile of excess cash holdings a firm falls in in any given year. 
Next, we examine the influence of different levels of turnover growth on excess cash holdings.  
4.4.2.2 Excess Cash and Turnover Growth 
One of our key areas of interest is how levels of growth opportunities affect the amount of 
Excess cash held. We use turnover growth over the previous year to demarcate into three groups 
of growth and examine the behaviour of determinants of excess cash under these scenarios. 
According to Harris and Raviv (2017), we would expect that the changes in variables in the 
middle group, determine the level of excess cash holdings to a larger extent than the other two 
groupings.  The Results are presented in Table 4.5. 
Again, we see that across all groups size is a negative and significant determinant of Excess 
cash as well as for all firms considered together. Earnings is similarly negative and significant 
across all groupings. Research and development Expense is uniformly positive and significant 
except for the first group. However, the economic magnitude is greatest for the middle group. 
Cost of Carry is uniformly positive and significant for all but the first group of firms, the 
magnitude of the second group is again slightly more than the others. Debt is negative and 
significant only at the middle group. This is also the case when all firms are combined together. 
Like debt, working capital is a negative and significant determinant of excess cash holdings 
only at the middle tercile of the groupings.  
Thus, apart from size and earnings which are uniformly negative and significant across all 
terciles of turnover growth, the results indicate varying key determinants across terciles. For 
the first tercile, key determinants are Size and Earnings which are both negative and significant. 
While Size, Earnings, Debt and Working Capital are negative determinants of excess cash in 
middle tercile, Research and Development and Cost of Carry are positive. For the third tercile, 
key determinants of excess cash are Research and Development Expense and Cost of Carry 
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which are positive while Size, and Earnings are negative. It will thus appear that, apart from 
size and earnings which are fairly consistent across all groups, the key determinants of excess 
cash also depend on the group of turnover growth a firm falls in in any given year.  As indicated 
by Harris and Raviv (2017) results suggest that changes in variables in the middle group, 
determine the level of excess cash holdings to a larger extent than the other two groupings.2 
We isolate High Technology and UK firms for further examination as our descriptive statistics 
indicate a higher level of excess cash holdings for these two groupings. Results are presented 
in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 below. 
Results are somewhat similar to those for all firms. For the first tercile, key determinants are 
Size and Earnings which are both negative and significant. In this case, dividends are also 
positive and slightly significant. For High Technology firms, as with all firms combined, Size, 
Earnings, Debt and Working Capital are negative determinants of excess cash in middle tercile 
of Firms. However, in this instance, CAPEX and is positive and significant determinant while 
Research and Development and Cost of Carry, though positive are not significant. For the third 
tercile, key determinants of excess cash are Research and Development Expense and Cost of 
Carry which are positive while Size and Earnings are negative. Again, we see an indication 
that results suggest that changes in variables in the middle group, determine the level of excess 
cash holdings to a larger extent than the other two groupings. 
When UK firms are considered in isolation, for the first group of firms, key determinants are 
Size and Earnings which are both negative and significant.  However, in this instance CAPEX 
is also negative and significant while Research and Development is positive. For UK firms in 
the middle group, while Size, CAPEX, Earnings and Debt are negative determinants of excess 
                                                          
2 This analysis was repeated by classifying firms into three different groupings using other criteria suggested by 
Harris and Raviv (2017). Criteria used include amount of CAPEX, Assets, Market to Book ratio and research and 
development expenses. Results are presented in Appendix C3 to C6. It appears that the clearest support for 
the dominance of variables in the middle grouping as determinants of Excess Cash holdings of Firms is when 
Turnover is used as the separator. 
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cash, Research and Development is positive. For the 3rd group, key determinants of excess cash 
are Research and Development Expense and Cost of Carry which are positive while Size is 
negative. This also points to the suggestion by Harris and Raviv (2017) that changes in 
variables in the middle group, determine the level of excess cash holdings to a larger extent 
than the other two groupings. We are also interested in why firms will hold a high level of 
Excess Cash and Debt at the same time. We therefore proceed with the analysis by examining 
various combinations of Debt and Excess Cash holdings. 
4.4.2.3 High Debt Levels and Excess Cash 
We proceed with the analysis by examining the simultaneous occurrence of relatively high debt 
levels and high Excess Cash. We do this by examining firms who are simultaneously in the 
Top Quartile of Debt to Net Assets ratio as well as the Top Quartile of Excess Cash Holdings. 
We compare this with firms with varying combinations of debt and excess. Results are 
presented in Table 4.8.    
Results indicate that key determinants of excess cash holdings for High Debt-High Excess cash 
Firms are Research and Development, Size and CAPEX. These are all negative and significant 
except for Research and Development expenses. CAPEX has the highest level of economic 
magnitude for this group of firms. When firms with High Debt-Low Excess Cash are 
considered, Size and Earnings appears to be negative and significant determinants. For Firms 
with Low Debt-Low Excess Cash, Research and Development is a positive determinant while 
size, cost of carry and debt are negative determinants of level of Excess cash holdings for firms 
included in our sample. Finally, for firms Low Debt-High Excess Cash, research and 
development and cost of carry are positive determinants while size and earnings are negative. 
When these different groups are compared, research and development is generally a positive 
and significant determinant except for High Debt Low-Excess cash firms. Size is uniformly 
negative and significant across all groups with the highest magnitude being for Low Debt-Low 
108 
 
Excess Cash Firms. Earnings is also a uniformly negative determinant. However, it is not 
statistically significant for High Debt – High Excess Cash and Low Debt – Low Excess Cash 
Firms. Other variables have mixed results across the groupings. While cost of carry is a slightly 
negative determinant for Low Debt- Low Excess Cash Firms. It is positive and highly 
significant for Low Debt- High Excess Cash Firms. It is not significant for the other groups. 
CAPEX is only significant for High Debt and High Excess Cash firms with a relatively high 
economic magnitude. Debt is only significant for Low Debt – Low Excess Cash Firms but only 
slightly so. Thus, it appears that there are differences in the magnitude and significance of 
variables determining the level of Excess cash holdings in these different groupings with key 
similarities being the influence of size and to lesser extent earnings. Results from our key group 
of interest, High Debt High Excess Cash firms, suggests that Research and Development 
Expenses and CAPEX are the key drivers for holding the unusual combination of high debt 
and high excess cash simultaneously. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined excess cash holdings of corporate firms in major European 
Economies. Results indicate that key determinants of Excess cash when all EU firms are 
considered together are, Earnings (negative), Size (negative), Debt (negative), Cost of Carry 
(positive) and Research and Development Expenses (positive). However, when considered 
separately, High Technology Firms across the sample and UK firms in isolation most closely 
approximate to the combined EU results. This is probably due to the relatively high levels of 
excess cash holdings of these two groupings. 
However, where all firms are analysed by quartiles of excess cash, a uniform result is that Size 
and Debt are negative and significant determinant of Excess cash across all four quartiles of 
excess cash. This is also the case when all firms are considered together. It will thus appear 
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that, apart from size and debt, the key determinants of excess cash depend on the quartile of 
excess cash holdings a firm falls in any given period. 
As suggested by Harris and Raviv (2017), when terciles of turnover growth are considered, 
apart from size and earnings, which are fairly consistent across groups, the key determinants 
of excess cash depend on level of Turnover growth a firm falls in any given year. The middle 
group however dominates whenever there is a difference between groupings. 
Finally, when different combinations of relative high debt and high excess cash are considered, 
there are differences in the magnitude and significance of variables determining the level of 
Excess cash holdings in these different groupings especially as it relates to the influence of 
Research and Development and CAPEX on Excess cash holdings. The key similarities are the 
influence of Size and, to lesser extent Earnings. Our results suggest that CAPEX and Research 
and Development expenses are the major reasons why firms have the unusual combination of 
High Debt and High Excess cash. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Cash Holdings for Publicly listed EU Firms 1990-2017  
Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. 
Sample period is 1991-2017.Size ($ Million) has been adjusted to constant 2017 Dollars using 
the CPI. CPI figures were obtained from the UK Data Service International aggregate. Market 
Prices obtained from Compustat Securities Daily.   
Variable  N Mean P50 Std.Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Cash All 23,605 0.41 0.12 1.04 0.00 13.77 5.96 45.96 
 France 3,015 0.39 0.14 0.86 0.00 9.52 5.72 44.47 
 Germany 3,868 0.34 0.14 0.66 0.00 7.71 4.97 34.18 
 Italy 826 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.00 2.72 5.86 57.26 
 Spain 426 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.00 1.15 3.06 16.75 
 UK 7,898 0.58 0.14 1.66 0.00 24.69 6.73 60.52 
 All Tech 10,077 0.69 0.22 1.42 0.00 13.77 4.20 23.68 
Earnings All 23,605 -0.06 0.07 0.56 -7.56 0.57 -5.75 44.14 
 France 3,015 -0.01 0.07 0.38 -3.54 0.52 -4.71 30.10 
 Germany 3,868 0.01 0.07 0.31 -3.87 0.81 -5.22 40.82 
 Italy 826 0.05 0.06 0.12 -1.21 0.27 -5.45 44.40 
 Spain 426 0.04 0.05 0.96 -0.62 0.29 -1.99 11.14 
 
UK 7,898 -0.17 0.07 0.94 -
17.75 
0.63 -7.50 88.45 
 All Tech 10,077 -0.19 0.06 0.78 -7.56 0.56 -4.01 22.28 
Size All 23,605 5.45 5.21 2.59 -2.17 15.34 0.25 2.68 
 France 3,015 5.78 5.28 2.73 -0.51 12.63 0.41 2.18 
 Germany 3,868 5.73 5.30 2.46 -0.57 11.72 0.45 2.65 
 Italy 826 6.26 5.92 2.07 2.00 16.66 0.88 4.31 
 Spain 426 6.53 6.49 2.10 0.95 11.17 0.08 2.89 
 UK 7,898 4.25 4.11 2.41 -2.83 10.75 0.21 2.62 
 All Tech 10,077 4.33 4.05 2.39 -2.17 14.91 0.69 3.69 
Debt All 23,605 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.00 11.95 6.75 69.00 
 France 3,015 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.00 3.58 3.99 49.35 
 Germany 3,868 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.00 2.51 2.80 20.26 
 Italy 826 0.29 0.28 0.18 0.00 1.90 1.82 15.72 
 Spain 426 0.34 0.32 0.22 0.00 2.43 2.33 19.90 
 UK 7,898 0.19 0.14 0.29 0.00 7.57 7.99 122.79 
 All Tech 10,077 0.18 0.11 0.25 0.00 2.57 3.46 22.14 
Working Cap All 23,605 0.02 0.05 0.29 -3.73 0.70 -3.89 34.98 
 France 3,015 0.02 0.04 0.22 -2.97 0.74 -2.37 22.50 
 Germany 3,868 0.07 0.09 0.28 -4.63 0.83 -3.18 34.85 
 Italy 826 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.00 2.82 11.32 144.54 
 Spain 426 -0.03 -0.01 0.21 -2.16 0.61 -2.82 27.65 
 UK 7,898 -0.01 0.04 0.40 -8.44 0.71 -7.18 98.77 
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 All Tech 10,077 -0.02 0.02 0.35 -3.73 0.69 -3.72 28.40 
CAPEX All 23,605 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.55 3.15 18.44 
 France 3,015 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.56 3.33 19.81 
 Germany 3,868 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.60 3.10 20.89 
 Italy 826 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.29 2.68 14.42 
 Spain 426 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.22 1.77 8.17 
 UK 7,898 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.73 3.65 23.11 
 All Tech 10,077 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.55 3.04 15.73 
R&D All 23,605 0.44 0.03 2.43 0.00 34.15 8.93 92.40 
 France 3,015 1.09 0.04 11.47 -0.04 298.86 20.35 483.37 
 Germany 3,868 0.19 0.04 1.43 0.00 47.78 23.19 682.05 
 Italy 826 0.04 0.02 0.18 0.00 2.82 11.32 144.54 
 Spain 426 0.05 0.00 0.17 -0.01 1.80 5.94 45.65 
 UK 7,898 0.97 0.31 6.94 -0.00 227.50 16.57 393.08 
 All Tech 10,077 0.88 0.09 3.47 0.00 34.19 6.14 44.47 
Carry Cost All 23,605 0.72 0.13 2.51 -2.81 38.94 8.56 95.49 
 France 3,015 0.29 0.09 0.82 -2.70 13.49 7.62 91.40 
 Germany 3,868 0.48 0.12 1.45 -1.37 21.60 7.80 83.87 
 Italy 826 0.12 0.03 0.33 -0.90 4.48 6.12 59.21 
 Spain 426 0.06 0.01 0.21 -0.16 2.50 6.33 57.65 
 UK 7,898 1.56 0.30 5.89 0.00 117.79 10.36 141.87 
 All Tech 10,077 1.18 0.22 3.45 -2.81 38.94 6.27 51.60 
MB All 23,605 1.92 1.38 1.75 0.35 26.31 4.48 34.99 
 France 3,015 1.69 1.31 1.40 0.54 29.92 7.69 117.26 
 Germany 3,868 1.69 1.29 1.91 0.23 88.44 25.62 1103.56 
 Italy 826 1.40 1.15 0.90 0.40 10.07 4.00 25.77 
 Spain 426 1.56 1.26 0.93 0.42 7.47 2.82 13.68 
 UK 7,898 2.32 1.61 2.47 0.27 36.32 5.24 45.39 
 All Tech 10,007 2.40 1.66 2.24 0.35 26.31 3.54 22.47 
Net Assets ($ 
Million) 
All 23,605 2,910.27 182.54 8091.53 0.07 52,979.20 3.93 18.67 
 France 3,015 6,083.85 228.36 14,520.58 0.78 97,235.20 3.10 12.61 
 Germany 3,868 6,575.81 240.03 20,659.42 0.68 147,559.50 4.45 23.94 
 Italy 826 5,571.27 481.68 16,465.45 8.84 103,832.50 4.10 20.03 
 Spain 426 6,750.88 842.95 17,918.05 2.73 91,774.27 3.50 14.20 
 UK 7,898 1,525.28 97.79 5,057.71 0.50 53,650.75 5.80 42.10 
 All Tech 10,077 1,419.27 55.25 6,059.94 0.07 52,979.20 5.81 37.90 
Total Assets ($ 
Million) 
All 23,605 3,251.85 220.91 8999.60 0.11 57,775.96 3.93 18.59 
 France 3,015 6,715.22 273.51 15,915.45 2.18 103,410.40 3.12 12.81 
 Germany 3,868 7,249.31 298.14 22,551.18 1.29 147,559.50 4.45 23.94 
 Italy 826 6,240.15 526.47 18,585.52 11.98 114,765.90 4.21 21.06 
 Spain 426 7,419.91 930.70 19,501.39 3.28 97,941.42 3.46 13.90 
 UK 7,898 1,702.49 121.38 5,579.28 0.19 60,617.54 5.72 40.94 
 All Tech 10,077 1,628.63 80.98 6,832.29 0.11 57,775.96 5.72 36.55 
Excess Cash All 23,591 0.24 0.14 0.32 0.01 3.18 3.46 18.96 
 France 3,015 0.37 0.20 0.45 0.01 4.25 2.36 11.66 
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 Germany 3,868 0.28 0.17 0.00 3.99 0.36 3.28 19.94 
 Italy 823 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.01 1.13 2.84 16.03 
 Spain 426 0.15 0.07 0.00 2.52 0.25 5.09 35.58 
 UK 7,884 0.38 0.16 0.00 7.03 0.65 4.21 26.96 
 All Tech 10,077 0.41 0.25 0.54 0.00 5.41 3.92 24.38 
 
Table 4.2 Cash Holdings of publicly listed EU firms 1990-2017  
The basic regression equations are CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e 
CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net Assets. E, Net 
Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. 
D, Debt = (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. S, Size 
is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. W, Net Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash and Short-Term 
Securities) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. Dv, Dividend, is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. R, Research and Development, is the ratio of 
research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard 
and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to constant 2017 Dollars. 
CPI figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the UK Data Service. Market Prices obtained 
from Compustat Securities Daily. High Tech Firms are classified using optimal SIC code classifications by Kile 
and Phillips (2009). Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 All France Germany Italy Spain UK AllTech 
Earnings -
0.127*** 
0.063 0.093 1.533* 1.580 -0.073** -
0.109*** 
 (0.031) (0.131) (0.136) (0.834) (1.188) (0.031) (0.033) 
Debt -
0.436*** 
0.048 -0.659** 0.750** 0.724 -
0.330*** 
-
0.546*** 
 (0.081) (0.173) (0.277) (0.373) (0.628) (0.110) (0.099) 
MB 0.000 -0.003 -0.010 0.028 0.155 -0.019* -0.012 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.010) (0.051) (0.126) (0.010) (0.009) 
Size -
0.424*** 
-
0.542*** 
-
0.541*** 
-
0.424*** 
-
0.557** 
-
0.581*** 
-
0.456*** 
 (0.028) (0.064) (0.088) (0.103) (0.256) (0.040) (0.041) 
Net WCap -
0.211*** 
-0.377** -0.273* -0.056 0.108 -0.227** -
0.225*** 
 (0.058) (0.168) (0.156) (0.319) (0.587) (0.098) (0.069) 
CAPEX 1.450*** 2.555*** 2.142*** 0.844 -1.511 1.223*** 1.727*** 
 (0.178) (0.501) (0.482) (1.415) (2.596) (0.270) (0.236) 
Dividend -0.032 -0.068 0.184 0.533 0.000 0.056 -0.033 
 (0.055) (0.146) (0.131) (0.429) (0.000) (0.092) (0.066) 
RD 0.011** -0.002 -0.003 0.857*** -0.098 0.004* 0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.014) (0.213) (0.413) (0.002) (0.006) 
Constant -
1.454***  
1.810*** 1.368** 2.868** -1.231 -
1.152*** 
0.468* 
 (0.146) (0.450) (0.569) (1.451) (1.665) (0.186) (0.262) 
R2 0.1209 0.1647 0.1382 0.1845 0.0931 0.1719 0.1912 
No. of Observations 23,591 3,015 3,868 826 426 7,884 10,077 
No. Of Firms 3,389 436 500 162 82 1,082 1,455 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by 
Firm 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
Table 4.3 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed EU firms 1990-2017  
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined 
as the residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and 
Development, is the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the 
Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Short Term 
Interest Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net 
Assets. E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. 
D, Debt = (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. 
W, Net Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. 
Dv, Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on 
nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to 
constant 2017 Dollars. CPI and Short-Term Interest Rate figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the 
UK Data Service. Market Prices obtained from Compustat Securities Daily. High Tech Firms are classified using optimal SIC 
code classifications by Kile and Phillips (2009). Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
          
 All France Germany Italy Spain UK Tech 
R&D 0.005** 0.000 0.008* 0.098*** 0.034 0.008*** 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.023) (0.059) (0.003) (0.004) 
MB -0.000 -0.011** -0.001 -0.018 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Size -0.078*** -0.159*** -0.178*** -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.135*** -0.105*** 
 (0.005) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) 
Carry 0.005*** 0.009* 0.000 -0.018 -0.033** 0.006* 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) 
CAPEX 0.053 -0.011 0.043 -0.098 0.078 -0.075 0.108 
 (0.045) (0.137) (0.082) (0.152) (0.078) (0.213) (0.099) 
Earnings -0.083*** -0.113** -0.081* -0.078 -0.008 -0.084*** -0.105*** 
 (0.013) (0.046) (0.048) (0.134) (0.078) (0.031) (0.023) 
Debt -0.047*** 0.091 -0.131*** 0.067* 0.053 -0.062 -0.076*** 
 (0.019) (0.075) (0.052) (0.040) (0.034) (0.046) (0.030) 
Net WCap -0.025 0.088 -0.187*** -0.001 0.031* -0.054 -0.026 
 (0.021) (0.142) (0.061) (0.039) (0.017) (0.059) (0.040) 
Dividend 0.009 -0.038 -0.007 0.087*** 0.000 0.021 0.034* 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.035) (0.017) (0.000) (0.044) (0.019) 
Constant 0.645*** 1.393*** 1.342*** 0.694*** 0.360*** 0.820*** 0.764*** 
 (0.028) (0.129) (0.118) (0.207) (0.019) (0.069) (0.056) 
R2 0.2661 0.2461 0.3349 0.3401 0.3205 0.1969 0.2546 
No. of Observations 18,995 2,385 3,164 603 324 6,478 8,130 
No. Of Firms 2,820 265 426 113 67 950 1,225 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
114 
 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
Table 4.4 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed EU firms 1990-2017 – Quartiles of 
Excess Cash  
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined 
as the residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and 
Development, is the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the 
Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Short Term 
Interest Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net 
Assets. E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. 
D, Debt = (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. 
W, Net Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. 
Dv, Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on 
nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to 
constant 2017 Dollars. CPI and Short-Term Interest Rate figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the 
UK Data Service. Market Prices obtained from Compustat Securities Daily. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. 
Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
  
 
   
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th All 
R&D -0.000 0.000 0.007 0.006** 0.005** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
MB -0.000 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.196) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Size -0.008*** -0.020*** -0.045*** -0.185*** -0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.002) (0.013) (0.005) 
Carry -0.000 -0.001** -0.001** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
CAPEX 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.060 0.053 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.087) (0.045) 
Earnings -0.002 0.011*** 0.001 -0.048*** -0.083*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.016) (0.013) 
Debt -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.028*** -0.116*** -0.047*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.035) (0.019) 
Net WCap -0.001 -0.006*** -0.007 0.004 -0.025 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.034) (0.021) 
Dividend -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.032 0.009 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.024) (0.009) 
Constant 0.113*** 0.241***  0.422*** 1.062*** 0.645*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.044) (0.028) 
R2 0.5712 0.4519 0.4263 0.3058 0.2661 
No. of Observations 5,079 4,776 4,697 4,443 18,995 
No. Of Firms 658 987 1,078 1,030 2,820 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
Table 4.5 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed EU firms 1990-2017 – Level of 
Turnover Growth  
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is 
defined as the residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, 
Research and Development, is the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book 
Ratio = [(Total Assets – Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total 
Assets. V, Asset Value, is the Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term 
Investments * 3 Month Short Term Interest Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio 
of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net Assets. E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related 
expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. D, Debt = (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net 
Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. W, Net Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net 
Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. Dv, Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to constant 2017 Dollars. CPI and Short-Term Interest 
Rate figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the UK Data Service. Market Prices obtained from 
Compustat Securities Daily. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
  
 
  
 1st 2nd 3rd All 
R&D 0.002 0.039** 0.007*** 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.002) 
MB 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size -0.099*** -0.056*** -0.075*** -0.078*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Carry 0.002 0.006** 0.005* 0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
CAPEX -0.070 -0.042 0.111 0.053 
 (0.075) (0.043) (0.091) (0.045) 
Earnings -0.092*** -0.088** -0.073*** -0.083*** 
 (0.023) (0.039) (0.016) (0.013) 
Debt -0.051 -0.068*** -0.028 -0.047*** 
 (0.039) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) 
Net WCap -0.016 -0.085** -0.027 -0.025 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.029) (0.021) 
Dividend 0.022 0.007 0.012 0.009 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.009) 
Constant 0.786*** 0.541***  0.592*** 0.645*** 
 (0.049) (0.041) (0.040) (0.028) 
R2 0.2642 0.4133 0.3068 0.2661 
No. of Observations 6,405 6,588 6,002 18,995 
No. Of Firms 2,062 1,945 2,074 2,820 
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
Table 4.6 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed EU High Tech firms 1990-2017 – 
Level of Turnover Growth 
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined as the residual 
of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and Development, is the ratio of research 
and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets – Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common 
Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = 
(Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Short Term Interest Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio 
of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net Assets. E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income 
Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. D, Debt = (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI 
adjusted Net Assets. W, Net Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net 
Assets. Dv, Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on nonfinancial 
firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to constant 2017 Dollars. CPI and 
Short-Term Interest Rate figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the UK Data Service. Market Prices obtained from 
Compustat Securities Daily. High Tech Firms are classified using optimal SIC code classifications by Kile and Phillips (2009). Financial firms 
and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 
  
 
   
 1st 2nd 3rd All Tech All Firms 
R&D 0.011 0.006 0.010** 0.007 0.005** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
MB -0.000 0.006 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
Size -0.150*** -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.105*** -0.078*** 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.005) 
Carry 0.006 0.005 0.011** 0.010*** 0.005*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
CAPEX -0.090 0.175** 0.070 0.108 0.053 
 (0.197) (0.079) (0.174) (0.099) (0.045) 
Earnings -0.134*** -0.084** -0.082*** -0.105*** -0.083*** 
 (0.046) (0.039) (0.026) (0.023) (0.013) 
Debt -0.087 -0.100*** -0.019 -0.076*** -0.047*** 
 (0.055) (0.032) (0.037) (0.030) (0.019) 
Net WCap -0.036 -0.072** -0.035 -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.048) (0.035) (0.055) (0.040) (0.021) 
Dividend 0.075* -0.020 0.040 0.034* 0.009 
 (0.041) (0.023) (0.027) (0.019) (0.009) 
Constant 1.014*** 0.582***  0.747*** 0.764*** 0.645*** 
 (0.105) (0.154) (0.078) (0.056) (0.028) 
R2 0.2944 0.4020 0.2945 0.2546 0.2661 
No. of Observations 2,747 2,850 2,533 8,130 18,995 
No. Of Firms 879 802 2893 1,225 2,820 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
 
Table 4.7 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed UK firms 1990-2017 – Level of 
Turnover Growth 
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined 
as the residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and 
Development, is the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the 
Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Short Term 
Interest Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net 
Assets. E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. 
D, Debt = (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. 
W, Net Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. 
Dv, Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on 
nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to 
constant 2017 Dollars. CPI and Short-Term Interest Rate figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the 
UK Data Service. Market Prices obtained from Compustat Securities Daily. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. 
Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. 
  
 
   
 1st 2nd 3rd UK All Firms 
R&D 0.010*** -0.003 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
MB -0.010 0.010* 0.009 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) 
Size -0.183*** -0.126*** -0.097*** -0.135*** -0.078*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005) 
Carry 0.006 0.004 0.008** 0.006* 0.005*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
CAPEX -0.439* -0.190** 0.428 -0.075 0.053 
 (0.241) (0.095) (0.483) (0.213) (0.045) 
Earnings -0.111* -0.186** -0.049 -0.084*** -0.083*** 
 (0.062) (0.091) (0.033) (0.031) (0.013) 
Debt -0.063 -0.150* -0.001 -0.062 -0.047*** 
 (0.041) (0.082) (0.052) (0.046) (0.019) 
Net WCap -0.056 -0.059 -0.056 -0.054 -0.025 
 (0.070) (0.086) (0.058) (0.059) (0.021) 
Dividend 0.032 -0.011 -0.011 0.021 0.009 
 (0.094) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.009) 
Constant 1.135*** 0.782***  0.606*** 0.820*** 0.645*** 
 (0.135) (0.095) (0.064) (0.069) (0.028) 
R2 0.2405 0.3413 0.2208 0.1969 0.2661 
No. of Observations 2,231 2,210 2,037 6,478 18,995 
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No. Of Firms 691 630 716 950 2,820 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
Table 4.8 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed UK firms 1990-2017 – Debt and 
Excess Cash Combinations 
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined as the 
residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and Development, is 
the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets – Total Common and 
Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the Natural Log of CPI adjusted 
Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Short Term Interest Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash 
Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net Assets. E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before 
Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. D, Debt = (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current 
Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. W, Net Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / 
Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. Dv, Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample 
period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to constant 2017 Dollars. CPI and Short-Term Interest Rate figures were obtained from 
International aggregate Data from the UK Data Service. Market Prices obtained from Compustat Securities Daily. Financial firms and 
utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. 
  
 HighDebt 
HighExCash 
HighDebt 
LowExCash 
LowDebt 
LowExCash 
LowDebt 
LowExCash 
All  
R&D 0.010* -0.004 0.012* 0.009** 0.005**  
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002)  
MB 0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.000  
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002)  
Size -0.107* -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.198*** -0.078***  
 (0.058) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.005)  
Carry 0.008 -0.001 -0.001* 0.006*** 0.005***  
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)  
CAPEX -0.919*** 0.002 -0.006 0.161 0.053  
 (0.262) (0.005) (0.015) (0.188) (0.045)  
Earnings -0.016 -0.006*** -0.001 -0.037* -0.083***  
 (0.047) (0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.013)  
Debt -0.051 -0.001 -0.007* 0.002 -0.047***  
 (0.047) (0.002) (0.004) (0.063) (0.019)  
Net WCap -0.043 0.000 0.000 0.030 -0.025  
 (0.052) (0.001) (0.003) (0.050) (0.021)  
Dividend -0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.038 0.009  
 (0.121) (0.001) (0.002) (0.039) (0.009)  
Constant 1.002*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 0.918*** 0.645***  
 (0.212) (0.007) (0.012) (0.159) (0.028)  
R2 0.2329 0.5311 0.5722 0.3190 0.2661  
No. of Observations 582 1,798 275 2,335 18,995  
No. Of Firms 273 399 84 643 2,820  
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Figure 4.1 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed EU firms 1990-2017 
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Table 4.9. Description of Variables  
Variable Proxy Variables Source 
Excess Cash Residual of panel regression of cash 
against a number of independent 
variables as per equation 1. 
See below. See below. 
R&D Research and Development Expense / 
Sales Turnover 
 XRD - Research and Development 
Expense.  SALE – Sales/ Turnover 
(Net) 
Compustat 
MB Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) 
+ (Common Shares Outstanding * 
Market Price)] / Total Assets. 
AT- Assets – Total. CEQ – 
Common/Ordinary Equity – Total. 
CSHOI – Com Shares Outstanding – 
Issue 
Market price 
Compustat  
 
 
 
Compustat 
Cost of Carry (Cash * 3 Month Short Term Interest 
Rates) / Net Assets. (Total Assets – 
Cash and Short-Term Securities) 
CH – Cash. AT- Assets – Total. CHE 
– Cash and Short-Term Investments. 
UK 3 Months Treasury Bill Rates 
Compustat  
 
UK Data Service 
Cash Holdings Natural Log of Cash and Short-Term 
Investments / Net Assets. (Total Assets 
– Cash and Short-Term Securities) 
CHE – Cash and Short-Term 
Investments. AT- Assets – Total 
Compustat 
Earnings (Earnings before Interest – Interest and 
related expenses – Income Taxes – 
Dividends) / Net Assets. (Total Assets 
– Cash and Short-Term Securities) 
EBITDA – Earnings Before Interest.  
XINT – Interest and Related Expense 
– Total.  TXT – Income Taxes – Total. 
DVC- Dividends Common / Ordinary. 
Compustat 
Total Debt (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current 
Liabilities) / Net Assets. (Total Assets 
– Cash and Short-Term Securities) 
DLTT- Long Term Debt – Total. DLC 
– Debt in Current Liabilities – Total 
Compustat 
Size Natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. 
(Total Assets – Cash and Short-Term 
Securities) 
CHE – Cash and Short-Term 
Investments. AT- Assets – Total 
Compustat 
 
UK Data Service 
122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net Working 
Capital 
(Working Capital – Cash and Short-
Term Investments) / Net Assets. (Total 
Assets – Cash and Short-Term 
Securities) 
WCAP- Working Capital (Balance 
Sheet). CHE – Cash and Short-Term 
Investments 
Compustat 
CAPEX Capital Expenditure / Net Assets (Total 
Assets – Cash and Short-Term 
Securities) 
CAPX – Capital Expenditures. CHE – 
Cash and Short-Term Investments. 
AT- Assets – Total 
Compustat 
Dividend Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
DVC- Dividends Common / Ordinary. Compustat 
Turnover 
Growth 
Sales/Turnover (Net) at t / 
Sales/Turnover (Net) at t-1 
SALE – Sales/ Turnover (Net) Compustat 
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APPENDIX 4.C 
Table 4.10.C1 Pair-wise correlation matrix (p values in parenthesis) 
  Cash Earnings Debt MB Size Net 
WCap 
CAP Div  RD 
Cash 1.00         
Earnings -0.38  1.00        
 (0.00)         
Debt -0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
1.00       
MB 0.32 -0.28 -0.01 1.00       
(0.00)  
 
(0.00)  
 
(0.30)  
 
      
Size -0.35 -0.35 0.16 -0.25 1.00      
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Net WCap -0.19 0.35 -0.32 -0.17 0.11 1.00     
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)      
CAPEX 0.14 -0.12 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.05 1.00    
(0.00)  
 
(0.00)  
 
(0.02)  
 
(0.65)  
 
(0.00)  
 
(0.00)  
 
   
Div -0.08 
 
0.10 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.08 
 
0.00 
 
-0.01 
 
1.00  
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)   
RD 0.28 -0.52 -0.02 0.20 -0.20 -0.14 0.06 -0.04 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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Table 4.11.C2 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed UK firms 1990-2017 – Level of 
CAPEX  
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined 
as the residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and 
Development, is the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the 
Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Treasury Bill 
Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net Assets. 
E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. D, Debt 
= (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. W, Net 
Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. Dv, 
Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on 
nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to 
constant 2017 Dollars. CPI figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the UK Data Service. Market Prices 
obtained from Compustat Securities Daily. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
  
 
  
 1st 2nd 3rd All 
R&D 0.000 0.008 0.013** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) 
MB 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Size -0.077*** -0.062*** -0.086*** -0.078*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Carry 0.009*** -0.002 0.003 0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
CAPEX -0.231* -0.148** 0.036 0.053 
 (0.131) (0.065) (0.056) (0.045) 
Earnings -0.053*** -0.108*** -0.061** -0.083*** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.026) (0.013) 
Debt -0.040* -0.042 -0.046 -0.047*** 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.019) 
Net WCap -0.041 -0.023 -0.018 -0.025 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.050) (0.021) 
Dividend 0.018 0.007 0.004 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.009) 
Constant 0.656*** 0.579*** 0.720*** 0.645*** 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.051) (0.028) 
R2 0.2986 0.2265 0.2471 0.2661 
No. of Observations 6,477 6,480 6,038 18,995 
No. Of Firms 1,659 1,836 1,615 2,820 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 4.12.C3 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed UK firms 1990-2017 – Level of 
Assets   
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined 
as the residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and 
Development, is the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the 
Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Treasury Bill 
Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net Assets. 
E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. D, Debt 
= (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. W, Net 
Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. Dv, 
Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on 
nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to 
constant 2017 Dollars. CPI figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the UK Data Service. Market Prices 
obtained from Compustat Securities Daily. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
  
 
  
 1st 2nd 3rd All 
R&D 0.007*** 0.003 0.003 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
MB -0.003 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Size -0.164*** -0.045*** -0.012*** -0.078*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) 
Carry 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
CAPEX 0.080 0.051* 0.017 0.053 
 (0.074) (0.030) (0.011) (0.045) 
Earnings -0.065*** -0.041** -0.020*** -0.083*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.007) (0.013) 
Debt -0.103*** -0.072*** -0.017*** -0.047*** 
 (0.028) (0.018) (0.003) (0.019) 
Net WCap -0.017 -0.035 -0.010* -0.025 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.006) (0.021) 
Dividend 0.012 0.004 -0.006** 0.009 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) 
Constant 0.969*** 0.422*** 0.164*** 0.645*** 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.011) (0.028) 
R2 0.3248 0.2729 0.4090 0.2661 
No. of Observations 5,985 6,314 6,696 18,995 
No. Of Firms 1,248 1,217 882 2,820 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 4.13.C4 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed UK firms 1990-2017 – Levels of 
Market to Book Ratio 
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined 
as the residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and 
Development, is the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the 
Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Treasury Bill 
Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net Assets. 
E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. D, Debt 
= (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. W, Net 
Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. Dv, 
Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on 
nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to 
constant 2017 Dollars. CPI figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the UK Data Service. Market Prices 
obtained from Compustat Securities Daily. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
  
 
  
 1st 2nd 3rd All 
R&D 0.006* 0.003 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
MB 0.006 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size -0.060*** -0.051*** -0.119*** -0.078*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) 
Carry -0.002 0.006 0.010*** 0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
CAPEX -0.018 0.014 -0.009 0.053 
 (0.049) (0.082) (0.084) (0.045) 
Earnings -0.037 -0.141*** -0.055*** -0.083*** 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.015) (0.013) 
Debt -0.031* -0.034** -0.058** -0.047*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.026) (0.019) 
Net WCap 0.009 0.007 0.002 -0.025 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.027) (0.021) 
Dividend -0.011 0.001 0.021 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.009) 
Constant 0.577*** 0.482***  0.802*** 0.645*** 
 (0.042) (0.036) (0.041) (0.028) 
R2 0.1887 0.3145 0.2820 0.2661 
No. of Observations 6,404 6,386 6,205 18,995 
No. Of Firms 1,609 1,794 1,507 2,820 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Table 4.14.C5 Excess Cash Holdings of publicly listed UK firms 2002-2016 – Level of R 
& D 
The basic regression equations are ECHit = α + β1Rit-1 + β2Mit-1 + β4Vit-1 + β5CCit-1 + e ECH, Excess Cash Holdings, is defined 
as the residual of regression CHit = α + β1Eit + β2Dit + β3Mit + β4Sit + β5Wit + β6Cit +   β7Dvit + β8Rit + e. R, Research and 
Development, is the ratio of research and developments Expense to Sales Turnover. M, Market to Book Ratio = [(Total Assets 
– Total Common and Ordinary Equity) + (Common Shares Outstanding * Market Price)] / Total Assets. V, Asset Value, is the 
Natural Log of CPI adjusted Total assets. CC, Cost of Carry = (Cash and Short-Term Investments * 3 Month Treasury Bill 
Rates) / Net Assets. CH, Cash Holdings, is defined as Natural Log of ratio of Cash and Short-Term Investments to Net Assets. 
E, Net Earnings = (Earnings before Interest – Interest and related expenses – Income Taxes – Dividends) / Net Assets. D, Debt 
= (Long Term Debt + Debt in Current Liabilities) / Net Assets. S, Size is the natural log of CPI adjusted Net Assets. W, Net 
Working Capital = (Working Capital – Cash) / Net Assets. C, CAPEX, is ratio of Capital Expenditure to Net Assets. Dv, 
Dividend, is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if Dividend > 0 and 0 otherwise. Computations are based on 
nonfinancial firms in Standard and Poor’s Compustat database. Sample period is 1991-2017. Size ($ Million) adjusted to 
constant 2017 Dollars. CPI figures were obtained from International aggregate Data from the UK Data Service. Market Prices 
obtained from Compustat Securities Daily. Financial firms and utilities are excluded. Regressions are estimated with firm fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by Industry. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
  
 
  
 1st 2nd 3rd All 
R&D -0.092*** -0.034 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.002) (0.002) 
MB -0.004** 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size -0.037*** -0.054*** -0.109*** -0.078*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) 
Carry 0.008*** -0.004 0.004** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
CAPEX -0.027 -0.032 0.088 0.053 
 (0.024) (0.038) (0.075) (0.045) 
Earnings -0.049* -0.072* -0.065*** -0.083*** 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.015) (0.013) 
Debt -0.019*** -0.042** -0.062** -0.047*** 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) 
Net WCap 0.016* -0.020 -0.033 -0.025 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) 
Dividend -0.004 -0.001 0.019 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) 
Constant 0.387*** 0.548*** 0.774*** 0.645*** 
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.039) (0.028) 
R2 0.2489 0.2239 0.2825 0.2661 
No. of Observations 6,001 6,506 6,488 18,995 
No. Of Firms 1,336 1,247 1,128 2,820 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***, **, * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (robust standard errors in bracket) 
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Chapter 5 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis presents three studies related to the influence of information asymmetry on capital 
structure and cash holding decisions of firms especially when they experience unusual events. 
The first examines the funding patterns of publicly listed UK firms during investments spikes 
from 1996 to 2017. The study investigates the specific implications of the pecking order theory 
against the background of different sizes of investments and firms. The particular focus on 
investment spikes is due to the existence of relatively higher levels of financing deficit during 
these periods. The examination of crisis and non-crisis periods also leads to an investigation of 
the coincidence of higher financing deficits and general market uncertainty.  These scenarios 
present some ground for extending existing studies on the pecking order theory.  
Specifically, this study examines two implications of the pecking order theory. The first test is 
on the choice between internal funds and external funds during investment spikes. The second 
implication examined is that the firms prefer debt to equity during investment spikes. We find 
that, on average, firms prefer external funds to internal funds. More importantly, compared to 
debt financing, equity financing is relatively more sensitive to financing deficits based on our 
full sample. When it comes to the components of financing deficits, we find that investments 
are the predominant determinant for seeking external funds. In numbers, £1 increase in 
investments requires 49 pence raised from equity issues, which is higher than the corresponding 
requirement of 18 pence from debt issues. On the implication that firms prefer debt to equity, 
our results, based on the probit model, suggests otherwise. This is particularly the case for the 
whole sample and small firms considered separately.  Large firms, however, exhibit a 
preference for debt over equity financing. 
We examine whether the size effect matters on the funding patterns. Our main finding is that 
both size of firm and investment are important in explaining differences in funding patterns of 
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firms, though size of the firm dominates. Our empirical evidence shows that small firms prefer 
issuing equity to debt to address financing deficits even during times of large investments. 
These findings contrast with the pecking order theory. Large firms, on their part, issue more 
debt than equity when there are financing deficits linked to huge investments.  We can explain 
this result by the risk of default and repayment concerns by banks.  Large firms have more 
capital to address potential investment opportunities. It is, therefore, more likely that banks will 
lend money to large firms than small firms.  Furthermore, while small firms use about the same 
amount of external capital to fund large and regular investments, large firms use relatively more 
external capital to fund large investments than small investments. This state of affairs is due to 
small firms’ higher growth levels and less tangible assets making debt less attractive. 
The second paper explored the funding patterns of constrained UK private firms especially 
when they must fund a larger than usual level of investment. Our analysis reveals differing 
effects determinants of leverage have on constrained and unconstrained private firms. The 
greatest differences being the influence of growth and size and, to a limited extent, age on 
leverage. On the one hand, we find that growth has a positive and significant effect on leverage 
for unconstrained firms while it is negative and not statistically significant for constrained 
firms. On the other hand, size has a negative and significant relationship for constrained firms 
but a positive and insignificant, near zero influence on unconstrained firms. Though age has a 
negative influence for both types of firms, for unconstrained firms it is not statistically 
significant. This is consistent with a limited access of constrained private firms to borrowing 
due to their smaller size and younger age when compared with their unconstrained 
counterparts. This may also limit growth opportunities constrained firms can take advantage of 
due to limited access to external funds.  
Our key interest is in how constrained firms' fund huge investments. Under such scenarios, our 
results indicate that leverage ratios of constrained firms are generally nonresponsive to changes 
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in traditional determinants of leverage during periods of huge investments. This is quite 
different from what obtains for unconstrained firms who show the expected highly significant 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage ratios. We attribute this to a relatively 
higher level of information asymmetry of constrained private firms. When faced with financing 
deficits, we find that constrained firms make changes to their equity holdings while 
unconstrained firms make changes to their debt holdings. We believe this is attributable to the 
effects of information asymmetry which limits the ability of constrained firms to address 
financing deficits by changing the mix of their debt and equity holdings. 
 
Chapter 4 examines excess cash holdings of corporate firms in major European economies. 
Results indicate that key determinants of Excess cash when all EU firms are considered 
together are, Earnings (negative), Size (negative), Debt (negative), Cost of Carry (positive) and 
Research and Development Expenses (positive). However, when considered separately, High 
Technology Firms across the Sample and UK firms in isolation are the closest to the combined 
EU results. This is probably due to the relatively high levels of excess cash holdings of these 
two groupings. 
However, where all firms are analysed in various quartiles of excess cash, size and debt are 
uniformly negative and significant determinants of Excess cash across all four quartiles as well 
as for all firms considered together. Thus, apart from size and debt, the key determinants of 
excess cash depend on the quartile of excess cash holdings a firm falls in any given period. 
As suggested by Harris and Raviv (2017), when terciles of turnover growth are considered, 
apart from size and earnings, which are consistent across groups, the key determinants of 
excess cash depend on level of turnover growth for a firm in any given year. The middle tercile 
however dominates whenever there is a difference between groupings suggesting that the 
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middle group reacts the most to changes in excess cash holdings as this tercile tends to hold 
excess cash. 
Finally, when different combinations of relative high debt and high excess cash are considered, 
there are differences in the magnitude and significance of variables determining the level of 
Excess cash holdings in these different groupings especially in relation to the influence of 
Research and Development and CAPEX on Excess cash holdings. The key similarities being 
the influence of size. This suggests that high debt high excess cash firms are different mainly 
because of their relatively larger investments in research and development and CAPEX. 
5.1 Limitations and Further Research 
The papers have been set against the background of the pecking order theory and the 
influence of information asymmetry on the capital structure and cash holding decisions of 
firms. These theories inherently imply that interest rates are positive and thus there will be a 
positive financial cost to holding debt and / or excess cash. However, it will be interesting to 
see what obtains in a negative interest rate regime against the background of relevant interest 
rate theories.  
The papers have also been examined within the context of more traditional financing 
instruments like internal cash, debt and equity. It would be interesting to see how the 
financing and investing dynamics change when non-traditional funding sources like equity 
crowd funding, peer to peer lending, venture capital financing and angel financing are 
brought into the mix for private firms. 
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